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ARTICLES 
THE HONOR OF PRIVATE LAW 
Nathan B. Oman*
 
 
While combativeness is central to how our culture both experiences and 
conceptualizes litigation, we generally notice it only as a regrettable cost.  
This Article offers a less squeamish vision, one that sees in the struggle of 
people suing one another a morally valuable activity:  the vindication of 
insulted honor.  This claim is offered as a normative defense of a civil 
recourse approach to private law.  According to civil recourse theorists, 
tort and contract law should be seen as empowering plaintiffs to act against 
defendants, rather than as economically optimal incentives or as a means of 
enforcing duties of corrective justice.  The justification of civil recourse 
must answer three questions.  First, under what circumstances—if any—is 
one justified in acting or retaliating against a wrongdoer?  Second, under 
what circumstances does the state have reasons for providing a mechanism 
for such action?  Finally, how are the answers to these questions related to 
the current structure of our private law?  This Article offers the vindication 
of wronged honor as an answer to these three questions.  First, I establish 
the historical connection between honor and litigation by looking at the 
quintessential honor practice, dueling.  Then I argue that the vindication of 
honor is normatively attractive.  I do this by divorcing the idea of honor 
from unsavory associations with violence and aristocracy, showing how it 
can be made congruent with certain core modern concerns.  In particular, 
when insulted parties act against wrongdoers, they reestablish the position 
of respect and equality that the insult upset.  I then show how having the 
state provide plaintiffs with a means of vindicating their honor avoids 
making the political community complicit in the humiliation of its citizens 
and provides those citizens with a means of exercising their agency in ways 
that provide a foundation for self-respect.  Finally, I show those areas of 
private law where honor operates most powerfully as a justification for 
providing recourse through the courts, while acknowledging that it 
operates less powerfully as a reason in other areas. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Suing someone is an aggressive act.  Friends almost by definition do not 
sue each other.  Family members only sue one another when the bonds of 
affection have been torn asunder by contention, rivalry, and wrongdoing.  
When a victim tells a tortfeasor, “I am going to sue you!” he is not making 
some abstract statement about the legal consequence of negligence.  Rather, 
he is threatening to strike back at the person who hurt him.  Likewise, 
litigation is a gladiatorial enterprise, a struggle between opposing 
champions bent on claiming victory for their clients.  It is common to speak 
of lawyers as “hired guns” or “junkyard dogs.”1  The unusually litigious are 
seen as being touchy, contentious, and aggressive.2  Oddly, while 
combativeness is central to how our culture both experiences and 
conceptualizes litigation, this fact has garnered very little scholarly 
attention.  At best, it is noticed as a regrettable cost of the legal system.3
 
 1. This was our family’s affectionate designation for my great uncle, a successful 
plaintiff’s attorney in Utah who made his fortune representing farmers and ranchers in suits 
against railroads and mining companies. 
  
This Article articulates a less squeamish vision of litigation, one that sees in 
the very struggle of people suing one another a morally valuable activity:  
the vindication of insulted honor. 
 2. See generally PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE (1994); ROBERT A. 
KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM:  THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001); WALTER K. OLSON, 
THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION:  WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 
(1991). 
 3. See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING:  NEGOTIATING TO CREATE 
VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 100–01 (2000) (discussing bitter litigation between Art 
Buchwald and Paramount Pictures and noting that “[t]heir process for resolving their dispute 
was so inefficient that fighting the battle cost six times more than the amount awarded”). 
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Private law theory is dominated by two philosophical families.  On one 
side are consequentialists, best represented by the partisans of law and 
economics, who believe that areas such as torts and contracts should be 
arranged so as to create efficient incentives.4  On the other side are various 
rights-based theorists who believe that private law can and should serve 
non-instrumentalist goals.5  Among this latter group a debate has developed 
between the partisans of corrective justice and the partisans of civil recourse 
theory.6
To date, the civil recourse theorists have relied primarily on formalistic 
arguments, if one can use the term “formalistic” in a non-pejorative sense.  
The recourse theorists have sought to show how their approach better fits 
the institutional structures of private law.  They have been less successful at 
explaining the normative value of allowing plaintiffs to act against 
defendants.  To the extent that such normative arguments have appeared, 
they have overwhelmingly been couched in the language of individual 
rights and liberal political philosophy.  In contrast, this Article justifies civil 
recourse by appealing to the idea of honor rather than to liberal notions of 
rights.  In so doing, it seeks to connect debates in the theory of private law 
to a recent surge of interest, among historians and other scholars in the 
humanities, in the idea of honor.
  Occurring mainly within tort theory but bleeding into contracts 
scholarship as well, the dispute hinges on whether private law should be 
thought of as enforcing a wrongdoer’s duty to make the victim of his 
wrongdoing whole or whether tort and contract should be thought of as 
institutions that empower plaintiffs to act against defendants. 
7
The normative problem of civil recourse can be broken into at least three 
discrete but inter-related questions.  First, there is the question of under 
what circumstances—if any—one is justified in acting or retaliating against 
a wrongdoer.  Can such action be justified?  Second, there is the question of 
under what circumstances the state has a good reason for providing a 
mechanism for such action.  Even if one is justified in retaliating against a 
wrongdoer, what reason is there for the state to involve itself in the process?  
Finally, assuming that we have answers to the previous two questions, how 
 
 
 4. See infra notes 11–18 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 19–29 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra Part I.B. 
 7. See generally KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE HONOR CODE:  HOW MORAL 
REVOLUTIONS HAPPEN (2010); JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR:  NATIONAL 
POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (2002); SHARON R. KRAUSE, LIBERALISM WITH HONOR 
(2002); WILLIAM IAN MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING:  FEUD, LAW, AND SOCIETY 
IN SAGA ICELAND (1990); WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE (2006); WILLIAM IAN 
MILLER, HUMILIATION:  AND OTHER ESSAYS ON HONOR, SOCIAL DISCOMFORT, AND VIOLENCE 
(1993); FRANK HENDERSON STEWART, HONOR (1994); ALEXANDER WELSH, WHAT IS 
HONOR?:  A QUESTION OF MORAL IMPERATIVES (2008); BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, 
SOUTHERN HONOR:  ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD SOUTH (25th anniversary ed. 2007); 
Alison L. LaCroix, To Gain the Whole World and Lose His Own Soul:  Nineteenth-Century 
American Dueling as Public Law and Private Code, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 501 (2004); C.A. 
Harwell Wells, The End of the Affair?  Anti-Dueling Laws and Social Norms in Antebellum 
America, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1805 (2001); Stephen Darwall, Two Kinds of Recognition 
Respect for Persons (2009) (unpublished paper) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). 
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are those answers related to the current structure of our private law?  Are 
the civil wrongs that currently give rise to a private cause of action the sort 
of wrongs that justify acting or retaliating against a wrongdoer?  Do the 
reasons that justify the state’s involvement in this process apply equally to 
all civil wrongs or does civil recourse provide a more powerful justification 
for empowering plaintiffs in some circumstances rather than others? 
This Article offers answers to all three of these questions.  It focuses on a 
single feature of civil recourse, namely, the way in which the law empowers 
plaintiffs to act against defendants.  Rather than looking to liberal theories 
of rights, however, it looks to older notions of honor and its vindication, 
showing not only how these ideas continue to motivate our laws but also 
why we might want them to do so.  I begin the argument by establishing a 
connection between the common law and the vindication of wronged honor 
through an exploration of the relationship between litigation and the 
quintessential practice of honor:  dueling.  Having established the 
connection between honor and litigation, I then turn to the three normative 
questions posed by civil recourse theory. 
First, I argue that the vindication of honor is a normatively attractive 
form of action.  I do this by divorcing the idea of honor from unsavory 
associations with violence and aristocracy, showing how it can be made 
congruent with certain core modern concerns.  In particular, when insulted 
parties act against the wrongdoers that have victimized them, they 
reestablish the position of respect and equality that the insult upset.  I then 
show how having the state provide plaintiffs with a means of vindicating 
their honor both avoids making the political community complicit in the 
humiliation of its citizens and provides those citizens with the means for 
exercising their agency in ways that provide a foundation for honor and 
self-respect.  Finally, I show those areas of private law where honor 
operates most powerfully as a justification for providing recourse through 
the courts while acknowledging that honor operates less powerfully as a 
reason in other areas. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides a brief 
and opinionated overview of modern private law theory, showing how this 
Article’s argument about honor fits into contemporary scholarly debates.  
Part II illustrates the close connection between honor and civil recourse by 
examining the historical relationship between litigation and the practice of 
dueling.  Part III then offers a normative defense of civil recourse based on 
the vindication of honor.  The Article concludes by discussing some of the 
implications and limitations of the defense of honor offered herein. 
I.  THE REVIVAL OF PRIVATE LAW 
For most of the last century the idea of private law as a conceptually 
distinct subject has been treated with suspicion.  Beginning at least with the 
publication of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s The Path of the Law, many, if not 
most, legal thinkers have assumed that private law is best thought of as 
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simply an idiosyncratic form of public regulation.8  To be sure, the 
distinction between private law and public law has never disappeared from 
legal discourse, but for many it is something of a theoretical 
embarrassment.9
A.  Law and Economics and the Corrective Justice Response 
  The present, however, is an unusually fertile moment in 
the theory of private law.  The field now has the benefit of two generations 
of sophisticated law and economics scholarship devoted to interpreting, 
elucidating, and critiquing the law of contracts, tort, and property.  More 
recently, philosophers of law have turned their attention to the area, offering 
criticisms of economic interpretations of the law and putting forward 
counter-theories.  The result is a rich intellectual discussion, one that is 
again exploring the distinctive character of private law.  To understand the 
contribution that honor might make to our understanding of private law, it is 
necessary to see how it fits into this ongoing debate. 
Modern private law theory began in 1960.  Picking such dates is always 
arbitrary, but in that year Ronald Coase published his article The Problem 
of Social Cost,10 which formulated what afterwards became known as the 
Coase Theorem.11
 
 8. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461–65 
(1897) (arguing that law—including private law such as tort and contract—should be 
conceptualized as an instrument serving public policy goals); see also David Rosenberg, The 
Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases:  A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 849, 889–92 (1984) (arguing that tort law should be arranged to advance 
regulatory goals). 
  This argument laid the foundation for much of modern 
law and economics scholarship, providing a framework that scholars could 
apply to a wide range of topics.  Coase’s article was followed by other 
seminal pieces in the 1960s, and by the 1970s, law and economics had 
taken shape as a distinctive approach to legal theory with the publication of 
 9. Writing in the heyday of the Critical Legal Studies movement, Duncan Kennedy 
declared, after working through the arguments in his eight-page article, that “one simply 
loses one’s ability to take the public/private distinction seriously as a description, as an 
explanation, or as a justification of anything.” Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of 
the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1357 (1982).  Strangely enough, 
closing in on three decades after the publication of Kennedy’s article, people continue to 
refer to private law and public law on a regular basis. 
 10. See RONALD H. COASE, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), 
reprinted in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 95 (1988). 
 11. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 25 (5th ed. 1998) (“The new 
law and economics began with Guido Calabresi’s first article on torts and Ronald Coase’s 
article on social cost.” (citing COASE, supra note 10; Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on 
Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961))).  Coase himself never 
formulated the Coase Theorem as a formal theorem, but this has not stopped others from 
stepping into the breach.  Posner’s definition reads, “The most celebrated application of the 
concept of opportunity cost in the economic analysis of law is the Coase Theorem.  The 
theorem, slightly oversimplified . . . is that if transactions are costless, the initial assignment 
of a property right will not affect the ultimate use of the property.” Id. at 8. See generally 
Daniel A. Farber, Parody Lost/Pragmatism Regained:  The Ironic History of the Coase 
Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397 (1997) (providing an intellectual history of the Coase 
Theorem). 
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Guido Calabresi’s The Costs of Accidents and Richard Posner’s Economic 
Analysis of Law.12
Law and economics, of course, is far more than a theory of private law.  
If anything, it is hostile to divisions between private and public law, 
preferring to see the whole of the corpus juris through the lens of economic 
efficiency.
 
13  The key positive insight of law and economics scholarship is 
that law creates incentives and that the effect of those incentives on 
behavior can be modeled using the tools of neoclassical economics, the 
rational actor model, and transaction-costs economics.14  Its key normative 
claim is that these incentives should be arranged so as to maximize 
aggregate social wealth.15  There is nothing about either of these claims that 
is necessarily confined to traditional private law fields such as torts and 
contracts.  Nevertheless, private law has proven a fertile area for law and 
economics scholarship, leading one partisan of the approach to enthuse that 
it “is the touchstone of private law scholarship, a key that appears to unlock 
every door.”16  Even more sober authors have declared, “As in private law 
scholarship generally, economic analysis is the dominant paradigm in 
contemporary contracts scholarship.”17  Something very similar could be 
said of the law of torts or property.18
The very success of law and economics has acted as a spur to alternative 
approaches to private law.  After a period of relative neglect, more 
 
 
 12. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS:  A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); POSNER, supra note 11; Calabresi, supra note 11.  For a 
somewhat hostile recounting of the rise of the law and economics movement, see GARY 
MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS:  LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END 
83–105 (1995). 
 13. Posner writes, 
Among the disciplines that have challenged the legal doctrinalists’ monopoly of 
legal studies, pride of place belongs to economics, which has made great progress 
in the last thirty years and, applied to law, has revolutionized the profession’s 
understanding of fields of law as disparate as antitrust, torts (mainly accidents), 
contracts, corporations, and bankruptcy.  At the academic level it has made inroads 
into most other legal fields as well, ranging from adoption to zoning. 
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 84–85 (2d ed. 1995). 
 14. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 353 (1990) (noting that 
the basic assumption of law and economics is that “people are rational maximizers of their 
satisfaction”). 
 15. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE, at xvii (2002) 
(“Our thesis is that social decisions should be based exclusively on their effects on the 
welfare of individuals—and, accordingly, should not depend on notions of fairness, justice, 
or cognate concepts.”). See generally Guido Calabresi, An Exchange About Law and 
Economics:  A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553 (1980) (defending the 
desirability of efficiency as a normative criterion); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and 
Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 
(1980) (same); see also Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?  A Response to Professors 
Calabresi and Posner, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980) (attacking both arguments). 
 16. F.H. BUCKLEY, JUST EXCHANGE:  A THEORY OF CONTRACT, at xi (2005). 
 17. Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 687 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 
2002). 
 18. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 
92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1141 n.58 (2007) (noting that law and economics is arguably the 
dominant theoretical approach to tort law today). 
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philosophically inclined theorists have once more turned their attention to 
topics such as tort and contract.19  The first round of philosophical work on 
private law focused on the bilateralism of private law actions.  Bilateralism 
refers to the way in which plaintiffs and defendants are related in private 
litigation so that money damages by defendants are always paid to plaintiffs 
to whom the law gives no claim on anyone else.20  For example, in torts, 
only victims can sue tortfeasors, and tortfeasors are the only people victims 
can sue.  They are not, for example, given a claim against a public 
insurance fund.  As philosophically minded critics of law and economics 
scholarship have pointed out, if liability is supposed to be about the creation 
of optimal incentives this bilateral structure makes no sense.21  Indeed, the 
point was noted earlier by economists, who recognize for example that 
assessing expectation damages against contract breachers may force them to 
internalize the costs of breach, leading to efficient breach decisions, but that 
giving those damages to plaintiffs leads to over-reliance and inefficient 
behavior on the part of promisees.22  The payment to plaintiffs creates 
moral hazard problems and there is no a priori economic reason that the 
incentivizing of defendants should be left to the plaintiffs that they have 
wronged.23  A better justification of this feature, philosophical critics have 
argued, can be found in the idea of corrective justice.24
Corrective justice was first defined, rather enigmatically, by Aristotle, 
who wrote, “[T]hat which is just in private transactions is indeed fair or 
equal in some sort, and that which is unjust is unfair or unequal; but the 
proportion to be observed here is not a geometrical proportion . . . but an 
arithmetical one.”
 
25
 
 19. See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 41–52 (2004) (summarizing 
contemporary debates in the philosophy of contract law). See generally JULES L. COLEMAN, 
RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE:  A THEORY OF 
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995).  
  The distinction Aristotle drew between geometric and 
 20. See Nathan B. Oman, The Failure of Economic Explanations of the Law of Contract 
Damages, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 829, 846–51 (2007) (discussing the nature of 
bilateralism). 
 21. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233 (1988) 
(book review). 
 22. See generally Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property:  The Model of 
Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1985); Aaron S. Edlin, Cadillac Contracts and Up-front 
Payments:  Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 98 
(1996); Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and 
Optimal Investment, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 478 (1996); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Reliance, 
Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L. & ECON. 691 (1983); William P. Rogerson, 
Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 15 RAND J. ECON. 39 
(1984); Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466 
(1980); Steven Shavell, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q.J. ECON. 
121 (1984). 
 23. See Coleman, supra note 21, at 1240–47 (offering a philosophical critique of 
economic explanations of tort law’s bilateral structure); Oman, supra note 20, at 846–59 
(making a similar argument in the context of contract law). 
 24. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 21, at 1248–53; Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the 
Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349 (1992); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective 
Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 409–11 (1992). 
 25. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, ch. 4, at 148 (F.H. Peters trans., C. Kegan 
Paul & Co. 1881). 
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arithmetic ideas corresponds to the distinction between distributive and 
corrective justice.  In referring to their mathematical properties, Aristotle 
was seeking to elucidate their basic structure rather than their substantive 
content, a distinction similar to that drawn by John Rawls between the 
concept of justice and various conceptions of justice.26
Corrective justice, in contrast, is indifferent to the moral characteristics of 
different people, but simply seeks to correct transactional wrongs by 
arithmetically subtracting from a wrongdoer to compensate her victim.
  The concept of 
distributive justice is geometrical because it allocates the good things of life 
to people in proportion to their possession of some morally relevant 
characteristic.  The characteristic chosen by different conceptions of 
distributive justice varies.  For egalitarians, this might be humanity, which 
all people possess in equal measure, while for philosophical aristocrats, it 
might be virtue, which some have in greater abundance than others. 
27  
Corrective justice theorists of private law have argued among themselves 
over precisely how the idea should be interpreted.  The chief point of 
contention is whether the idea requires fault on the part of a defendant or 
whether the mere invasion of a plaintiff’s rights should give rise to a duty to 
compensate.28  All agree, however, that wrongdoers have such a duty to 
make their victims whole, and that the bilateral structure of private 
litigation enforces this duty.29
B.  The Civil Recourse Critique of Corrective Justice 
 
The most recent round of private law revivalism has focused on a 
different feature of civil liability:  private standing.30
 
 26. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 9 (rev. ed. 1999) (“The concept of justice I 
take to be defined, then, by the role of its principles in assigning rights and duties and in 
defining the appropriate division of social advantages.  A conception of justice is an 
interpretation of this role.”). 
  Private standing 
 27. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, bk. V, ch. 4, at 148 (“For it makes no difference 
whether a good man defrauds a bad one, or a bad man a good one, nor whether a man who 
commits an adultery be a good or a bad man; the law looks only to the difference created by 
the injury, treating the parties themselves as equal, and only asking whether the one has 
done, and the other suffered, injury or damage.”). 
 28. Compare JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE:  IN DEFENCE OF A 
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY (2001), COLEMAN, supra note 19, Jules L. 
Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 427 (1992), Jules L. 
Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15 (1995), Jules L. Coleman, 
Property, Wrongfulness and the Duty to Compensate, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 451 (1987), and 
Coleman, supra note 21, with WEINRIB, supra note 19, Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and 
Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407 (1987), Weinrib, supra note 24, Ernest J. Weinrib, 
Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349 (2002), Ernest J. Weinrib, 
Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2001), and Ernest J. Weinrib, Non-Relational Relationships:  
A Note on Coleman’s New Theory, 77 IOWA L. REV. 445 (1992). 
 29. For an argument that as a matter of existing law no such duty to pay damages exists, 
see Nathan B. Oman, Why There Is No Duty to Pay Damages:  Powers, Duties, and Private 
Law, FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1906753. 
 30. See generally John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law:  Due 
Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005); 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003) 
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refers to the fact that the law does not force transfers from defendants to 
plaintiffs as an independent enforcer of some norm of corrective justice.31  
Rather, the private law empowers plaintiffs to act against defendants.  
Plaintiffs may choose to bring suit against tortfeasors and contract 
breachers, but the law does not require that they do so.  Rather, it waits 
entirely on the plaintiff’s decision to sue.  Until she brings an action, 
nothing happens.  Benjamin Zipursky and John Goldberg, the chief 
proponents of what has been dubbed civil recourse theory, have argued that 
this plaintiff-centered system of private law cannot be adequately explained 
by either economic analysis or the duty of corrective justice.32
Economic theorists might seek to justify private standing by arguing that 
it represents a form of dispersed enforcement.  The idea is that we need a 
system of penalties for breach of contract or sub-optimal investment in 
precautions to avoid torts.
 
33  The information and resources of government 
prosecutors, however, are limited, so we empower the plaintiff as a kind of 
private attorney general to enforce efficiency norms.34  The problem with 
such an argument is that it fails to explain why the plaintiff must be the 
victim of the defendant.35  If our only goal is disaggregated enforcement, 
then information of wrongdoing, rather than the fact of being victimized, 
ought to be sufficient to empower plaintiffs.36  Indeed, this is precisely what 
we see in systems that are explicitly designed as disaggregated enforcement 
mechanisms, such as qui tam actions under whistle-blower statutes.37  In 
such cases the plaintiff need not be a victim of the defendant’s wrongdoing 
but may sue as a way of enforcing public policy merely on the basis of 
information.38
Corrective justice theory faces a similar difficulty.  The idea of corrective 
justice explains why a wrongdoer ought to have a duty to compensate his 
victim.  It is not clear, however, that empowering plaintiffs is best explained 
 
 
[hereinafter Zipursky, Civil Recourse]; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 623 (Jules Coleman & 
Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) [hereinafter Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law]. 
 31. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 30, at 699 (“The state does not impose 
liability on its own initiative.  It does so in response to a plaintiff’s suit demanding that the 
defendant be so required.”). 
 32. See id. at 699–709 (critiquing the law and economics approach); id. at 709–33 
(critiquing corrective justice theory); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse 
in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 45–52 (1998) (critiquing the law and economics 
approach); id. at 70–82 (critiquing corrective justice theory); see also Goldberg, supra note 
30, at 601–05 (contrasting corrective justice and civil recourse). 
 33. See Oman, supra note 23, at 843–46 (discussing economic theories of disaggregated 
enforcement). See generally Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation:  A Civil Recourse 
Theory of Contractual Liability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 529 (2011) (same). 
 34. See Oman, supra note 20, at 858 (discussing dispersed enforcement of contract 
liabilities). 
 35. See id. (noting “the basic contradiction between efficient breach and efficient 
reliance”).   
 36. See id. at 858–59 (highlighting economic arguments).   
 37. See id. at 858 (“In a qui tam action, the successful plaintiff is essentially paid a 
bounty for bringing a lawsuit that, rather than righting a personal wrong, serves simply to 
enforce a public policy.”).   
 38. Id. 
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as an effort to enforce this duty.39  For example, one could create a system 
in which one had a duty to compensate and where the failure to perform this 
duty was a crime.40  In other words, the duty to compensate might be 
enforced by prosecutors.  Understanding private litigation as the 
disaggregated enforcement of such a duty runs into the same sorts of 
problems that seeing private litigation as the disaggregated enforcement of 
efficiency-promoting fines faces.  Limiting the enforcement to actions by 
victims is something that Aristotle’s arithmetical principle does not 
explain.41  Rather, Aristotle tells us to subtract from wrongdoers and add to 
victims but seems indifferent as to who does the counting, adding, and 
subtracting.42
Recourse theorists insist that there is some distinctive normative goal that 
is vindicated by giving citizens the ability to proceed in court against those 
that have wronged them.  Zipursky and Goldberg’s normative defense of 
civil recourse is based on a reading of Locke’s Second Treatise on 
Government.
 
43  According to Locke, all men in the state of nature have the 
right to enforce natural law by acting to punish those who violate its 
demands.44  It is the delegation of this right to enforce natural law that gives 
rise to the state’s power to legislate and punish crime.45
 
 39. Cf. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 
  This delegation is 
30, at 714–18 (noting the difficulties with 
understanding tort law as enforcing duties of corrective justice). 
 40. Cf. id. at 712–13 (highlighting another critique of corrective justice theory).  
 41. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, bk. V, ch. 4, at 148 (“[T]hat which is just in private 
transactions is indeed fair or equal in some sort, and that which is unjust is unfair or unequal; 
but the proportion to be observed here is not a geometrical proportion . . . but an arithmetical 
one.”). 
 42. But see Alan Calnan, In Defense of the Liberal Justice Theory of Torts:  A Reply to 
Professors Goldberg and Zipursky, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1023, 1028–32 (2005) (arguing 
that Aristotle’s claim that consent vitiates injustice explains why corrective justice requires 
the empowering of victims).  I do not find Calnan’s argument persuasive.  It seems to me 
that Aristotle uses the notion of consent to explain why there is no duty to repair an injury 
suffered as a result of consented-to activity, such as injuries suffered in the boxing ring.  
Calnan, it seems to me, unjustifiably extends this principle to require some further choice by 
the victim after the fact in order for the duty to compensate to arise. 
 43. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 30, at 735 (discussing Locke); see also 
Goldberg, supra note 30, at 541–44 (same); cf. Andrew S. Gold, A Moral Rights Theory of 
Private Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1873 (2011) (arguing that private law instantiates 
pre-legal moral enforcement rights). 
 44. Locke writes: 
[T]hat all Men may be restrained from invading others Rights, and from doing hurt 
to one another, and the Law of Nature be observed, which willeth the Peace and 
Preservation of all Mankind, the Execution of the Law of Nature is in that State 
[i.e., the state of nature], put into every Mans hands, whereby every one has a right 
to punish the transgressors of that Law to such a Degree, as may hinder its 
Violation. 
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 289 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1960) (1690). 
 45. See id. at 342 (“And thus the Commonwealth comes by a Power to set down, what 
punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think worthy of it, 
committed amongst the Members of that Society, (which is the power of making Laws) as 
well as it has the power to punish any Injury done unto any of its Members, by any one that 
is not of it, (which is the power of War and Peace;) and all this for the preservation of the 
property of all the Members of that Society, as far as is possible.”). 
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not absolute.  In addition to the right to punish transgressors of natural law, 
writes Locke, man “has besides the right of punishment common to him 
with other Men, a particular Right to seek Reparation from him that has 
done it.”46  This right to seek reparations for damage done is, like the right 
to self-defense, inalienable.47  Accordingly, the state must provide an 
avenue that allows for the citizen’s “appropriating to himself, the Goods or 
Service of the Offender,”48
C.  Justifying Civil Recourse 
 if it is going to prohibit self-help with the 
criminal law and the like. 
While Zipursky and Goldberg have offered a reading of Locke’s Second 
Treatise in support of civil recourse theory, they have not yet offered a 
comprehensive normative defense.49  For example, while they have offered 
an interpretation of Locke’s writings, they have not tried to explicitly link 
civil recourse theory to Lockean ideas of self-ownership.50  They thus fail 
to explain exactly how the fictitious Lockean social contract operates as a 
justification.51
Jane Stapleton, for example, has taken issue with numerous aspects of 
Goldberg and Zipursky’s theory.
  Civil recourse theory identifies an important structural 
feature of private law actions.  Goldberg and Zipursky have made a 
plausible case that this feature rests on a normative foundation independent 
of corrective justice or economic efficiency.  The precise nature of that 
normative foundation, however, remains open to debate and interpretation. 
52  At the heart of Stapleton’s criticism is 
her pluralistic approach to tort.53
 
 46. Id. at 291. 
  Accordingly, she is skeptical of what she 
calls “the extremes of ‘high theory’ fashions” and “the race to the 
 47. Id. at 291–92 (describing the right to reparation for damage done and noting that one 
“cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private Man, for the damage he has received”). 
 48. See id. at 292. 
 49. See Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
1765, 1779 (2009) (noting that civil recourse theorists have not offered a full normative 
justification of their position). 
 50. Cf. Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 13–17 
(2009) (offering a detailed theory of the substantive basis of contractual obligations based on 
Lockean theories of property acquisition). 
 51. As Zipursky has written: 
  The Lockian social contract metaphor cannot take much pressure, as 
sympathetic critics from Hume to Rawls have pointed out.  The metaphor is often 
taken as a placeholder for a broader argument based on the existence of reasons for 
members of a group of persons within a state to regard a state bounded by certain 
norms as legitimate and authoritative and to act as members of it, reasons 
conditioned on the like-minded acceptance of other persons in the state.  This is 
not the place to undertake the project of unpacking the metaphor; a vast 
contractarian and anti-contractarian literature exists on this topic.  But assuming it 
is not incoherent generally to try to unpack contractarian arguments in this manner, 
it is worth looking at what it would mean in the context of private rights of action. 
Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, supra note 30, at 642. 
 52. Jane Stapleton, Evaluating Goldberg and Zipursky’s Civil Recourse Theory, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1529 (2006). 
 53. See id. at 1557 (expressing frustration with grand theories of tort law). 
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reductionist bottom of legal analysis in U.S. tort discourse.”54  She takes 
particular issue with the defense that Goldberg and Zipursky mount of 
Cardozo’s famous opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.55  
Zipursky insists that civil recourse reveals all tort duties as relational duties, 
that is, duties owed to particular classes of people rather than to the world at 
large.56  Stapleton, however, believes that this view commits civil recourse 
to a normatively unattractive vision in which some people are treated as 
second-class citizens without a claim on the care of their fellows.57  She 
also believes that “there are areas of tort law that can only be accounted for 
in instrumental terms, for example torts that are explicitly based on the 
violation of some public policy such as the tort of retaliation by an 
employer against an employee.”58
Coming from a very different position, Alan Calnan, a proponent of 
corrective justice theory, has offered a critique of civil recourse based on 
his more unitary approach to tort.
 
59  Calnan defends what he calls a liberal 
justice theory of corrective justice.60  One of his chief criticisms is that civil 
recourse theory, despite the protestations of its proponents, actually exalts 
vengeance.  “Goldberg argues,” he writes, “that the law uses compensatory 
damage awards to exact retribution against wrongdoers, a practice which 
presumably slakes the blood-thirst of their victims.”61  Not only is the 
slaking of blood thirst not normally seen as a morally attractive pursuit, 
Calnan argues that money damages are a peculiarly bad way of doing it:  
“Taking money is hardly the practical or moral equivalent of intentionally 
or negligently inflicting harm.  It is neither as severe nor as personal as the 
action it requites.”62
One of the most ambitious attempts thus far to provide a normative 
defense of civil recourse has been undertaken by Jason Solomon.
  Civil recourse is thus doubly damned for both 
pursuing normatively questionable ends and for doing so ineffectively. 
63  
Solomon begins by acknowledging the force of many of the criticisms 
leveled against civil recourse theorists, noting that Zipursky and Goldberg 
have thus far failed to provide a fully articulated normative justification for 
their framework.64
 
 54. Id. 
  Solomon seeks to fill this gap through a two-part 
argument.  The first part of the argument seeks to rescue civil recourse 
 55. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 56. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 30, at 715–16 (discussing the holding in 
Palsgraf). 
 57. Stapleton, supra note 52, at 1530–31 (criticizing treatment of some citizens in theory 
as “second-class”).  
 58. Id. at 1531. 
 59. Calnan, supra note 42, at 1072 (“I have tried to show that the concept of corrective 
justice explains a lot more of tort law then they are willing to admit.”).  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1059. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Solomon, supra note 49. 
 64. See id. at 1779 (“Goldberg and Zipursky see their primary task as interpretive, and as 
a result, have mostly avoided the task of defending a law of ‘civil recourse’ as one that is 
worth having.”). 
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theory by demonstrating that contrary to the claim put forward by John 
Finnis and others,65 we are morally justified in addressing resentment 
against our wrongdoers and demanding some satisfaction from them.66  
Solomon draws here on the work of Stephen Darwall, who has defended 
what he calls the second-person standpoint.67  On this view, morality 
consists not only of abstract moral rules but also of moral powers that 
victims have to make demands on their wrongdoers.68  There is a difference 
between claiming that there is an abstract moral duty not to tread on other 
people’s feet and a victim who says to a wrongdoer, “Hey!  You stepped on 
my foot!”  This second example is a claim by the victim of peculiar moral 
authority vis-à-vis the person standing on his foot.  This claim of authority 
is an instance of the second-person standpoint.69  Solomon then seeks to 
show how tort law embeds this second-person approach in our political 
institutions.  He writes, “From the state’s perspective, by establishing a 
system whereby individuals can hold those who have wronged them legally 
accountable, the state underscores the moral accountability we have toward 
one another as well.  The state does this simply by establishing the system 
and making it available.”70
To summarize, civil recourse theorists have identified an important 
structural element of private law.  An adequate interpretation of that law 
requires an account of private standing.  The justification for this feature, 
however, remains in doubt.  The remainder of this Article takes up the 
normative question of civil recourse theory.  Is it normatively desirable for 
victims to act against those who have wronged them?  Should the state 
provide a means for them to do so?  Do the current institutions of private 
law fulfill this function?  In the sections that follow, I argue that answers to 
these questions can be found in the apparently anachronistic idea of honor.  
I begin by showing the historical relationship between private law and 
honor by recovering the surprising connection between litigation and 
dueling. 
 
II.  DUELING AND CIVIL LITIGATION 
The vindication of wronged honor was an important part of the private 
law’s development of a system of redress.  This connection between civil 
recourse and the vindication of honor can be seen most dramatically in the 
 
 65. See, e.g., John Finnis, Natural Law:  The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 30, at 57 (“At its root the 
theory of recourse treats as worthy the emotional impulse of a victim of wrongdoing to ‘get 
even,’ by ‘act[ing] against’—having recourse against—the rights-violator.  This impulse is 
in most if not all respects contrary to the true principle, do not answer injury with injury.” 
(citing Zipursky, supra note 32, at 85)). 
 66. See Solomon, supra note 49, at 1785–97 (detailing the moral arguments behind such 
a proposition).  
 67. See generally STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT:  MORALITY, 
RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2006). 
 68. See id. at 99–104 (discussing moral accountability in second-person standpoint 
theory). 
 69. See id. at 39–48 (highlighting examples of the second-person stance). 
 70. Solomon, supra note 49, at 1810. 
44 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
relationship between litigation and the quintessential mode of vindicating 
one’s honor:  the duel.  During the heyday of the duel in the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, litigation in court was consistently seen as a 
competitor with pistols on the field of honor.71
The idea that the common law exists to provide subjects and citizens with 
a means of vindicating their honor has a long pedigree.  In his influential 
commentary on the Magna Carta in The Institutes of the Lawes of England, 
Sir Edward Coke wrote: 
  Both social practices 
involved a wronged victim acting against the person who insulted him in 
order to vindicate his honor. 
The law is called rectum [right], because it discovereth, that which is tort, 
crooked, or wrong, for as right signifieth law, so tort, crooked or wrong, 
signifieth injurie . . . .  It is called Right, because it is the best birth-right 
the Subject hath, for thereby his . . . honor, and estimation are protected 
from injury, and wrong . . . .72
Likewise, when discussing the seriousness of being accused of treason, 
Coke references the threat to “the life, honour, fame, liberty, blood, wife, 
and posteritie of the party accused.”
 
73
Blackstone similarly associates the wheels of civil justice with the 
vindication of personal honor.  Citing Montesquieu approvingly, he writes: 
 
[I]n free states the trouble, expense, and delays of judicial proceedings are 
the price that every subject pays for his liberty, and in all governments, he 
adds, the formalities of law increase in proportion to the value which is 
set on the honour, the fortune, the liberty, and life of the subject.74
Notice that Blackstone sees the complexity of judicial machinery as 
being a result in part of the value placed on the honor of the subject.  The 
formalities of the law are necessary to vindicate the subject’s honor and 
prevent overreaching by the state. 
 
Elsewhere, Blackstone identifies the wrongs redressed by the private law 
in terms of insults.  “The more effectually to accomplish the redress of 
private injuries,” he writes, “courts of justice are instituted in every 
civilized society, in order to protect the weak from the insults of the 
stronger, by expounding and enforcing those laws by which rights are 
defined, and wrongs prohibited.”75
 
 71. See infra notes 
  In seeing the common law as a bulwark 
of the weak against the “insults of the stronger,” Blackstone was drawing 
on a rhetorical trope that Coke had invoked a century and a half earlier.  
Working his family motto into his commentary, Coke wrote, “That the 
Common lawes of the Realme [are] . . . the surest sanctuary, that a man can 
take, and the strongest fortresse to protect the weakest of all; lex est 
78–95, 100–01 and accompanying text. 
 72. 2 EDWARD COKE, THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE:  INSTITUTES 872–
73 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003). 
 73. Id. at 949. 
 74. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *423–24. 
 75. Id. at *2–3. 
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tutissima cassis, and sub clypeo legis nemo decipitur.”76  Like a knight 
errant, the law was seen as the champion of the honor of the weak against 
the insults of the strong.77
The link between civil recourse and the vindication of honor can be seen 
most clearly in the historical relationship between litigation and dueling.  
Consider the rise of the eighteenth-century action of criminal conversation.  
At common law, “crim con” as it was known was neither criminal nor a 
conversation.  Rather, it was a civil cause of action for cuckoldry in which a 
wronged husband could sue his wife’s lover for money damages.
 
78  The 
legal basis for the action lay in the doctrine of coventure, which merged a 
wife’s legal identity into that of her husband, allowing him to sue her 
paramour for what amounted to trespass.79  (The misogyny inherent in the 
theory behind the action did not go unremarked on by contemporary proto-
feminists.)80  In the late seventeenth century, a cuckolded husband often 
would challenge his wife’s lover to a duel as a way of vindicating his 
honor.81  With the rise of crim con in the eighteenth century, however, 
dueling gave way to litigation.  Rather than meeting on the field of honor, 
husbands and lovers faced off in the courtroom, and rather than exacting 
blood, a husband sought damages for the invasion of his “property.”  The 
size of judgments in crim con cases, coupled with England’s draconian debt 
laws, often allowed husbands to use the civil courts to literally drive their 
adversaries into exile.82
Conflicts over infidelity were hardly the only area where law served as a 
substitute for dueling over offended honor.  Honor was also important for 
 
 
 76. 2 COKE, supra note 72, at 871.  The Latin maxims translate as “law is the safest 
helmet” and “under the shield of law no one is deceived.” Id. at 871 nn.151–52 (providing 
translations of the Latin maxims). 
 77. Something of this basic sensibility is carried forward in the so-called “open courts” 
provisions in thirty-nine state constitutions. See David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 
65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1201 n.25 (1992) (listing the thirty-nine state constitutional 
provisions).  Most of these provisions assert that the courts must be open “freely and without 
purchase.” E.g., IND. CONST. art. 1, § 12.  Others state that courts must be available to redress 
harms to “property or character.” E.g., MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 8.  These constitutional 
guarantees carry forward both aspects of the classical common law’s conception of civil 
redress.  First, they insist that the law must be available to the poor and the weak.  Second, 
they associate insults—wrongs to character and reputation—with the violation of personal 
security or the security of one’s property. 
 78. See LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE:  ENGLAND 1530–1987, at 231–300 (1990) 
(giving the history of the action of criminal conversation from its rise at the end of the 
seventeenth century to its abolition in 1857). 
 79. See id. at 231–34 (discussing the origins of criminal conversation actions in the writ 
of trespass on the case). 
 80. One woman remarked in 1735: 
Our law gives the husband the entire disposal of his wife’s person, but she does not 
seem to retain any property in his.  He may recover damages on any man who shall 
invade his property in her, but she cannot recover damages for any woman who 
shall invade her property in him. 
Id. at 242 (citation omitted). 
 81. See id. at 237–41 (discussing dueling between husbands and lovers). 
 82. See id. at 236 (noting that during the eighteenth century, Boulogne and Calais hosted 
large populations of English expatriates driven from their country by judgments in crim con 
cases). 
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the development of military law.  According to Blackstone the court martial 
is a “court of chivalry and honour,”83 yet the idea of honor presented an 
acute problem for eighteenth-century military law.  Among British officers, 
the ethos of gentlemanly honor, with its emphasis on courage and self-
discipline, was an important aspect of military virtue.84  Touchiness on 
points of honor, however, frequently led to duels between officers.85  The 
resulting ill feelings, violence, injuries, and occasional deaths, in turn, 
reduced military effectiveness.86  Accordingly, the Articles of War, which 
formed the core of eighteenth-century military law, prohibited dueling.87
This problem was solved by the charge of “conduct unbecoming an 
officer and a gentleman.”
  
Officers, however, continued to require a mechanism with which to 
vindicate their honor in the face of perceived slights. 
88  As the lawyers of the Judge Advocate General 
of the time noted, the offense was so vague as to raise what today would be 
conceptualized as due process concerns.89  Nevertheless, the very 
ambiguity of the offense proved useful.  It allowed officers to charge one 
another with “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman” in situations 
that would otherwise have led to duels.90  Courts martial in effect became 
courts of honor in which insulted or otherwise aggrieved officers could 
transform a literal confrontation with swords or pistols into a bloodless 
tourney of litigation.91  To be sure, the Articles of War and courts martial 
were unable to entirely suppress dueling among officers, but they did limit 
and channel it.92
The relationship between litigation and dueling is also on display in the 
politics of the early American republic, where affairs of honor became an 
important part of public life.  This can be seen most dramatically in the 
death of Alexander Hamilton at the hands of Aaron Burr in a duel arising 
out of Hamilton’s criticisms of Burr during the latter’s unsuccessful 
gubernatorial bid in New York.
 
93  Joanne B. Freeman, however, has 
documented the way in which the culture of honor permeated national 
politics in the early republic.94
 
 83. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 
  According to the elaborate rules of the code 
duello, litigation could act as a substitute for dueling depending on the 
74, at *337. 
 84. See Arthur N. Gilbert, Law and Honour Among Eighteenth-century British Army 
Officers, 19 HIST. J. 75, 75 (1976) (discussing the role of honor and courage). 
 85. See id. at 80 (noting that dueling continued despite official prohibition). 
 86. See id. at 79 (listing the consequences of dueling within the ranks). 
 87. See id. (reproducing the section of the Articles of War prohibiting dueling). 
 88. See id. at 76 (describing it as the “classic ‘honour’ crime”). 
 89. See id. at 77 (discussing the concerns of the Judge Advocate General). 
 90. See id. at 86 (highlighting the need for a legal method to resolve such disputes). 
 91. See id. at 87 (“In other words, the Court Martial could serve as a duelling substitute 
and play a role in settling disputes which might otherwise have ended in the death of one of 
the disputants.”). 
 92. Id. at 80. 
 93. See generally INTERVIEW IN WEEHAWKEN:  THE BURR-HAMILTON DUEL AS TOLD IN 
THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS (Harold C. Syrett & Jean G. Cooke eds., 1960) (documenting the 
Burr-Hamilton duel). 
 94. See generally FREEMAN, supra note 7. 
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social status of the offending party.  Social equals—gentlemen—had to be 
challenged to a duel in the case of insult, while a social inferior could be 
sued in the courts for libel or defamation.95
The culture of dueling persisted into the nineteenth century, but became 
increasingly fractured along sectional lines.
 
96  In 1838, the Kentucky 
Congressman William J. Graves killed the Maine Congressman Jonathan 
Cilley in duel.97  The affair garnered national attention and led to 
widespread condemnation of dueling in the North, where the older code of 
honor with its emphasis on gentlemanly touchiness about perceived slights 
and insults was replaced by a more commercial vision of honor centered on 
personal honesty and trustworthiness.98  In such a vision, litigation 
provided an adequate substitute for the code duello.  “No longer 
constitutive of the individual’s entire identity and unable to adapt to the 
modern world, the code of honor ceded the field to the narrower, legal 
modes of satisfaction.”99
It is important to realize that the code of honor was never confined 
merely to stylized insults.  For example, Andrew Jackson, one of the most 
notorious duelists in American history, was reportedly counseled by his 
mother, “Never . . . sue anybody for slander or assault and battery.  Always 
settle them cases yourself!”
 
100  The story is interesting for two reasons.  
First, Jackson’s mother saw dueling and litigation as potential substitutes 
for one another.  Second, her sense of honor extended beyond mere insults 
to traditional torts like assault and battery, with the content of honor’s 
protected sphere being defined by legal language.  Indeed, one of the last 
duels fought in the South, at Savannah in 1877, arose out of a dispute over a 
contract between two lawyers.101
None of this discussion is meant to imply that the common law in some 
way endorsed dueling.  To the contrary, the law sought with varying 
degrees of success to suppress dueling.
 
102  Blackstone, for example, 
discusses dueling in the chapter of his Commentaries devoted to homicide.  
There he castigated the practice as one where “both parties meet avowedly 
with an intent to murder . . . in direct contradiction to the laws of both God 
and man; and therefore the law has justly fixed the crime and punishment of 
murder on them, and on their seconds also.”103
 
 95. See id. at 129 (noting that printers risked “a caning or libel suit” for publishing 
pamphlets that insulted political elites). 
  Yet it is clear that 
 96. See LaCroix, supra note 7, at 505–06. 
 97. See id. at 529–36 (detailing one of the most “infamous” duels in American political 
history).  
 98. See id. at 507 (“In this way, the law replaced the code of honor’s conception of 
individual life as entirely public—and personal insults as therefore worthy of public 
settlement—with a new idea that public redress ought to be limited to certain types of insult 
affecting certain special realms of human activity.”). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Frank T. Wheeler, Satisfaction Due a Gentleman:  Early Conflict Resolution, 8 J.S. 
LEGAL HIST. 1, 2 (2000). 
 101. See id. at 6–9 (recounting the events leading to the Adams-Richards duel in 1877). 
 102. See generally Wells, supra note 7. 
 103. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at *199. 
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Blackstone strongly sympathized with the desire to vindicate one’s honor 
by acting against the person who had transgressed it.  Hence, he worried 
that prohibitions on dueling demand of gentlemen “a degree of passive 
valour [such that] . . . the strongest prohibitions and penalties of the law will 
never be entirely effectual to eradicate this unhappy custom.”104
[A] method [must] be found out of compelling the original aggressor to 
make some other satisfaction to the affronted party, which the world shall 
esteem equally reputable, as that which is now given at the hazard of the 
life and fortune, as well of the person insulted, as of him who hath given 
the insult.
  
Accordingly, Blackstone thought that: 
105
Likewise, in the 1814 case of Merest v. Harvey,
 
106 the court of common 
pleas upheld the damage award in a trespass case using Blackstone’s 
reasoning.  “It goes to prevent the practice of duelling,” stated Justice 
Heath, “if juries are permitted to punish insult by exemplary damages.”107
Strikingly, one of America’s most important apologists for dueling in the 
nineteenth century took a very similar position.  In his influential 1858 
how-to manual for duelists, former South Carolina Governor John Lyde 
Wilson
 
108 denied that he was “an advocate of duelling.”109
The indiscriminate and frequent appeal to arms, to settle trivial disputes 
and misunderstandings, cannot be too severely censured and 
deprecated. . . .  But in cases where the laws of the country give no 
redress for injuries received, where public opinion not only authorizes, 
but enjoins resistance, it [sic] needless and a waste of time to denounce 
the practice.
  He wrote: 
110
Note how Wilson, like Blackstone, links dueling to the absence of 
adequate legal redress for wrongs and the social demand that insults to 
honor be answered.
 
111
 
 104. Id. 
  Both of them, in short, believed that law should 
provide redress for affronts to personal honor. 
 105. Id. 
 106. (1814) 128 Eng. Rep. 761, 5 Taunt. 442 (C.P.). 
 107. Id.; see also Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages:  From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA 
L. REV. 957, 1008–15 (2007) (discussing the relationship between injury and insult in early 
tort cases involving punitive damages). 
 108. See LaCroix, supra note 7, at 515–19 (discussing Wilson’s background and 
influence). 
 109. JOHN LYDE WILSON, THE CODE OF HONOR; OR RULES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF 
PRINCIPALS AND SECONDS IN DUELLING 4 (1858). 
 110. Id. at 6. 
 111. Elsewhere, Wilson defends dueling with Lockean arguments that bear a striking 
resemblance to those marshaled by Zipursky and Goldberg in favor of civil recourse theory.  
After invoking the classic Lockean argument in favor of revolution, and analogizing the 
insulted gentleman to the victim of tyranny, Wilson writes: 
How many cases are there, that might be enumerated, where there is no tribunal to 
do justice to an oppressed and deeply wronged individual?  If he be subjected to a 
tame submission to insult and disgrace, where no power can shield him from its 
effects, then indeed it would seem, that the first law of nature, self-preservation, 
points out the only remedy for his wrongs. 
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While the claim that civil litigation is, like the duel, a means of 
vindicating one’s honor may seem initially implausible, history suggests 
otherwise.  This history, of course, does not provide a normative defense of 
civil recourse.  Nor does it demonstrate that our current law can be seen as 
redeeming lost honor.  It does, however, suggest that such ideas, far from 
being a fanciful analogy to litigation, have long been concretely associated 
with it.  This in turn suggests the value of further examining these ideas, in 
effect providing a prima facie warrant for the more detailed arguments that 
follow. 
III.  A MODERN DEFENSE OF HONOR 
Can honor provide a normative justification for civil recourse today?  
Initially, an affirmative answer to this question seems unlikely.  To modern 
ears, invoking honor seems quaint at best.  At worse, it has a jingoistic and 
aristocratic sound, suggesting the exaltation of violence and abusive, 
inegalitarian social relationships.  Accordingly, honor finds few defenders 
among contemporary scholars.112
A.  Honor in a Modern World 
  Hopefully the previous section has 
established a historical and interpretive connection between the idea of civil 
recourse and the vindication of one’s honor.  The task of this section is to 
persuade the reader that the vindication of personal honor through litigation 
is normatively desirable.  The task has four parts.  First, I must extricate the 
idea of honor from unsavory associations with anachronistic, aristocratic 
societies.  Second, I must provide a normative defense of victims of insults 
to honor acting against those that have wronged them.  Third, I must 
provide reasons why the state should provide a mechanism for vindicating 
one’s honor.  Finally, I must show how the particular normative defense 
that I have offered connects to the structure of private litigation. 
The term “honor” has a distinctly anachronistic flavor to it.  It calls forth 
images of knights errant, duelists, and others inhabiting an atavistic moral 
universe that seems far removed from the modern world.  Peter Berger 
provided an apt summary of this attitude, writing: 
Honour occupies about the same place in contemporary usage as chastity.  
An individual asserting it hardly invites admiration, and one who claims 
to have lost it is an object of amusement rather than sympathy. . . .  At 
best, honour and chastity are seen as ideological leftovers in the 
 
Id. at 4–5; cf. Goldberg, supra note 30, at 541–44 (noting that under Locke’s theory of 
government, individuals give up a portion of their right to self-preservation upon emerging 
from the state of nature); Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 30, at 735 (stating that Locke 
argued for the use of deadly force in only limited circumstances).  Note how Wilson links 
the legitimacy of dueling to both the absence of a legal redress and to the law of nature, in 
particular the right of self-preservation. Cf. LOCKE, supra note 44, at 291–92 (discussing how 
the natural right of self-preservation requires that “the Magistrate” provide a means of 
redress). 
 112. Few defenders, but not no defenders. See generally APPIAH, supra note 7; KRAUSE, 
supra note 7; WELSH, supra note 7. 
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consciousness of obsolete classes, such as military officers or ethnic 
grandmothers.113
The bare fact of anachronism, of course, is not an argument against 
honor, unless one subscribes to a kind of chronological snobbery whereby 
the present is always presumed to be wiser than the past.  Indeed, private 
law is itself old fashioned—if not, one hopes, anachronistic—predating 
fields such as administrative law, constitutional law, or even criminal law 
by many centuries.
 
114
According to one influential interpretation, honor was a value of 
hierarchical, aristocratic societies, but in the modern world honor has been 
transformed into the more democratic idea of dignity.
  Anachronism, however, does raise two possible 
concerns.  The first is that honor is associated with moral ideas that we now 
have good reasons for rejecting.  The second is that whatever its 
justifiability in the past, honor is somehow unfit for modern societies. 
115  Honor, on this 
theory, is associated with one’s status within a social hierarchy in which 
institutions provide the primary definition of roles and identities.116  Hence, 
for example, the honor of a knight in feudal society was defined in terms of 
his position within a social hierarchy.  It entitled him to the deference of 
social inferiors, while making him honor-bound to show similar deference 
to those above him on the social ladder.117  Closely associated with this 
institution- and hierarchy-bound conception of honor is honor’s alleged 
failure to differentiate between external status and internal moral worth.118
 
 113. Peter Berger, On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honour, reprinted in 
LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 149, 149 (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984). 
  
 114. Such anachronism, however, may provide fodder for functionalist interpretations of 
private law.  While little remarked upon today, for example, Oliver Wendell Holmes offered 
a theory of legal anachronism in which rules and institutions developed in the past to serve 
now obsolete purposes survive into the present only because they serve current needs quite 
different than those that gave them life. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON 
LAW 5–33 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) (setting forth Holmes’s theory of legal 
development). 
 115. See CHARLES TAYLOR, The Politics of Recognition, in PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 
225, 226 (1995) (“As against this [archaic] notion of honor, we have the modern notion of 
dignity, now used in a universalist and egalitarian sense, where we talk of the inherent 
‘dignity of human beings’ or of citizen dignity.”). 
 116. See Berger, supra note 113, at 151 (“[H]onour is a direct expression of status, a 
source of solidarity among social equals and a demarcation line against social inferiors.”); 
Darwall, supra note 7, at 4–5 (“Honor respect . . . mediates and underlies an essentially 
hierarchical social order of honor.  It recognizes someone []as having a specific social status 
that not just anyone can have, and it helps constitute that status in a way that is very different 
from the relation between the second-personal respect involved in mutual accountability and 
equal authority or dignity.”). 
 117. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE:  A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
EQUALITY 249 (1983) (“In a hierarchical society like that of feudal Europe, a title is the 
name of a rank attached to the name of a person.  To call a person by his title is to place him 
in the social order and, depending on the place, to honor or dishonor him.”). 
 118. See Darwall, supra note 7, at 5 (“It is important that honor respect is a kind of 
recognition rather than appraisal respect.  It consists neither in any form of esteem nor in any 
view of someone as worthy of esteem, nor, for that matter, as worthy of honor.  As with 
recognition respect of any kind, we honor someone by how we conduct ourselves toward 
her, by regulating our conduct in certain ways.  It is something we broadly do.  Honor 
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The feudal knight had honor because of his status rather than any particular 
quality that he might possess.  Such honor as he had in the possession of 
some noble character trait—such as courage or strength—lay in its 
recognition by others rather than the mere fact of its existence.  To be sure, 
he could be shamed by his actions but only to the extent that they were 
public, holding him up to scorn before others. 
Perhaps the chief proponent of this narrative is Charles Taylor.  In his 
magisterial Sources of the Self:  The Making of the Modern Identity, he 
traces what he sees as the evolution of Western moral consciousness from 
an external ethic of honor to an internal ethic of dignity.119  According to 
Taylor, the idea of honor is tied to an ethic that places ultimate importance 
on the self reflected back by the regard of others.120  What matters is how 
we are thought of, our external reputation and esteem.  He then traces the 
replacement of this ethic by one that increasingly turns inward, grounding 
moral worth not in external regard but rather in a person’s internal 
contemplation of himself.121  He ties this development to the rise of 
Cartesian philosophy with its emphasis on the internal intellectual activity 
of the knower, as opposed to earlier epistemological systems that 
emphasized the intelligibility of the universe.122
One can see something of the intellectual shift posited by Taylor in the 
debates over dueling in antebellum America discussed above.  Northern 
anti-dueling activists emphasized the importance of inner integrity over 
public reputation, arguing that Southern dueling was based on a shallow 
concern with the appearance of character as opposed to its reality.
 
123  In 
contrast, antebellum duelists continued to live in a world where there was 
no sharp distinction between inner moral worth and external social 
regard.124
 
respect is thus unlike any attitude, like esteem, which we may simply have toward a 
person.”). 
  Fitting the debate into Taylor’s typology, Northerners were 
 119. See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF:  THE MAKING OF THE 
MODERN IDENTITY (1989); TAYLOR, supra note 115, at 225–56. 
 120. See TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF, supra note 119, at 3–91 (discussing identity and 
the nature of the good).  
 121. See id. at 111–99 (tracing inwardness of this ethic). 
 122. See id. at 143–58 (describing the emergence of Cartesian philosophy). 
 123. See LaCroix, supra note 7, at 529 (“Dueling was beginning to lose its usefulness in 
the North because it revealed nothing about individuals’ inner character at a time when 
northerners were increasingly focused on the role of private morality in a commercial 
society.”). 
 124. LaCroix provided an apt summary of this stance, writing: 
[T]hey viewed as completely permeable the boundary between themselves, their 
morals, and their society; therefore, one could argue, they did not conceive of it as 
a boundary at all.  (And further, one could argue, such a boundary did not exist.)  
Thus, the question “Do I duel to validate my own conception of myself as a 
gentleman or to achieve external validation from those around me when assembled 
in their corporate form as ‘society’?” would have been unthinkable to the early-
nineteenth-century dueling gentleman because the order of his universe hinged on 
the belief that these two forms of validation were identical, that self-conception as 
a gentleman was worthless without providing society with the opportunity to judge 
for itself. 
Id. at 513–14. 
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shifting toward the modern notion of human dignity, while Southerners 
continued to be motivated by an older ethic of honor. 
If the dominant narrative about honor is correct, then we seem to have 
good reasons for rejecting it.  Few today are willing to defend the kind of 
hierarchical and aristocratic society that would allow some to maintain their 
honor by demanding deference from social inferiors on the basis of their 
office or status.  Rather, we are much more likely to subscribe to a universal 
ideal of human dignity.  Dignity in this egalitarian and democratic sense, 
however, is not something that one acquires by either great deeds or social 
status.  Rather, it is something that everyone possesses through the mere 
fact of being human.125  For example, it is not the sort of thing that one can 
lose, even when one commits atrocious crimes.126
Likewise, the concept of honor, with its emphasis on public regard, 
seems dangerously disconnected from real moral worth.  As Falstaff 
declares before the climactic battle in Henry IV, Part 1: 
 
Well, ‘tis no matter; honor pricks me on.  Yea, but how if honor prick me 
off when I come on?  How then?  Can honor set to a leg?  No.  Or an arm?  
No . . . What is honor?  A word. . . .  Therefore I’ll none of it.  Honor is a 
mere scutcheon; and so ends my catechism.127
For Falstaff, honor may cause one to risk life and limb but it is ultimately 
without substance.  It is “a mere scutcheon”—an outward sign—with no 
real worth.  Indeed, to the extent that it calls forth unjustified acts of 
violence or self-immolation, it is positively pernicious.  As a more modern 
poet bleakly wrote of the soldiers of the Great War, “They went arrayed in 
honour.  But they died . . . .”
 
128  On this view, the concept of honor is 
dangerous precisely because it might motivate people to acts of great self-
sacrifice or violence on the basis of mere public esteem.  In its most 
grotesque form, such an emphasis on reputation as the arbiter of moral 
worth could hold up manifestly wicked acts such as racist lynchings as 
honorable endeavors.129
 
 125. See Darwall, supra note 
 
7, at 6 (“When we think that even scoundrels have a dignity 
that entitles them to respectful forms of treatment (say, in holding them accountable), we 
clearly have something other than esteem in mind.  The idea is not that personhood is 
somehow an admirable quality:  [w]hat is in play here is not appraisal but recognition.”). 
 126. As Martha Nussbaum writes, “Even where malefactors are concerned . . . while 
punishments must be meted out for reasons including both the deterrent and the retributive, a 
concern with the dignity of the offender should always be solidly built into the system of 
punishment . . . .” MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY:  DISGUST, SHAME, AND 
THE LAW 174–75 (2004). 
 127. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF HENRY THE FOURTH act 5, sc. 1, lines 
125–41 (Bertrand Evans, ed. 1963).  It is worth noting that Falstaff speaks in prose, an 
unheroic idiom but one that conveys a certain realism that iambic pentameter lacks. 
 128. SIEGFRIED SASSOON, Banishment, in COUNTER-ATTACK AND OTHER POEMS 44, 44 
(1918). 
 129. See WYATT-BROWN, supra note 7, at 402 (“Lynch law, vigilantism, and charivaris 
were the ultimate expressions of community will.  They established the coercive lines 
between acceptable and unacceptable behavior for all members of the Southern social 
order.”). 
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There are reasons to believe, however, that this critique of honor is 
overstated.  Honor need not be associated exclusively with inegalitarian 
societies.  The anthropologist Frank Stewart has usefully distinguished 
between what he calls vertical honor and horizontal honor.130  Vertical 
honor refers to the status and public esteem that one gains by virtue of one’s 
place in a social hierarchy from those below him on the social ladder.131  
Horizontal honor consists of the respect that one gets from a group of peers, 
what Stewart calls the “honor group.”132  Something like this distinction 
runs through the writing of the classical common law theorists of the 
sixteenth century.133  Coke speaks of how the law provides redress for 
“injury[] and wrong” to a subject’s “honor, and estimation.”134  However, 
in most of the cases where Coke or other classical common law writers such 
as Hale or Selden speak of honor, they are talking about the honor 
associated with feudal tenures and offices.135  When Coke and Blackstone 
insist that “[t]he king is likewise the fountain of honour,”136
While notions of vertical honor may be out of place in a modern 
democracy, there is nothing inegalitarian about retaining the respect of 
one’s peers.  Indeed, one might think of citizenship in a modern republic as 
itself a kind of honor group, in which one claims the right to be respected 
by a group of equals.
 they are 
referring to this vertical notion of honor.  Strikingly, however, they seldom 
connect this idea of honor within an aristocratic hierarchy to the honor 
vindicated by civil redress through the courts.  Rather, this second form of 
honor is something at least potentially possessed by all subjects and 
protected by the law.  In other words, the honor vindicated by the common 
law right of redress was a horizontal rather than vertical form of honor. 
137
Likewise, there are reasons for believing that any shift from honor to 
dignity has not entirely extirpated the earlier idea from modern society.  
First, the “old” notion of honor was never purely a matter of public esteem.  
  On this view, to be dishonored is to be placed 
outside the community of equals.  It is to not be accorded that respect to 
which membership in the political community makes one entitled.  Such a 
notion of honor is congruent with widely held notions of equal citizenship 
and equal claims to respect and concern from the political community.  To 
be sure, it would be a mistake to reduce the idea of honor to a Kantian 
notion of respect, but it would also be a mistake to suppose that the concept 
of honor only makes sense within hierarchical, aristocratic societies. 
 
 130. See STEWART, supra note 7, at 54–63. 
 131. See id. at 59. 
 132. See id. at 54 (describing the context of this “honor right”). 
 133. See generally Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2 
OXFORD UNIV. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 155, 165 (2002) (discussing the legal thought of Coke, 
Hale, Selden and other sixteenth-century common law theorists); Gerald J. Postema, 
Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 OXFORD UNIV. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 1, 
22–27 (2003) (same). 
 134. 2 COKE, supra note 72, at 872–73. 
 135. See, e.g., 1 COKE, supra note 72, at 56. 
 136. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at *271. 
 137. See WELSH, supra note 7, at 9–21 (building off similar findings from anthropology 
and psychology).   
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In discussing the notion of honor, Aristotle was clear that what matters is 
not simply the good opinion of others, but rather the good opinion of the 
virtuous.138  To be honorable was not simply a matter of being famous but 
of having the set of excellences—virtues—that entitled one to a good 
reputation.  The mere calumnies of those known to be without virtue are no 
dishonor.  Similarly, the inward morality that Taylor documents has found 
it remarkably difficult to do without the idea of an observer, if only a 
hypothetical one.  This can be seen clearly, for example, in the moral 
philosophy of Adam Smith, which is organized around the idea of an 
impartial spectator whose judgments seem remarkably similar to the good 
reputation among virtuous men espoused by Aristotle.139
Furthermore, honor continues to be a part of our conceptual apparatus, 
even though we frequently disguise the fact with democratic sounding 
language.  This can be seen most clearly in our use of the word “dignity” 
itself.  When Taylor and those subscribing to his narrative about the history 
of honor use the term, it refers to some intrinsic value that all human beings 
have.  Dignity is thus closely tied to egalitarian ideas of equal worth and 
liberal conceptions of human beings as the holders of inalienable rights.  
We might, for example, say that slavery is an affront to the idea of human 
dignity.  This does not imply that a slave lacks dignity.  Indeed, it is 
precisely the fact that the slave is endowed with human dignity regardless 
of his social status that makes slavery grotesque.  It is not that enslavement 
takes away one’s dignity but rather that it refuses to acknowledge such 
dignity.  Even slaves have human dignity.  This is precisely what gives the 
idea its liberal and egalitarian traction. 
 
On the other hand, we have another way of using the term dignity.  We 
might say of an older man of experience and wisdom that he behaves with 
great dignity.  There are a number of things to notice about this usage of the 
term.  First, it is egalitarian.  The older man’s dignity is not a matter of 
socioeconomic class.  On the other hand, the dignity we are talking about is 
not universal.  Some people are not dignified.  Civil rights marchers had 
dignity.  Those screaming vile epithets at them were without dignity.  
Second, dignity in this sense is something that can be lost as opposed to 
merely not being recognized.  When a mugger pushes a dignified matron 
into the mud, she is humiliated.  Her dignity is taken away.  This is true 
even if we do not understand her moral worth as being diminished and even 
if we understand that dignity of a sort can be maintained in the midst of 
victimization.  The evil of the mugger’s shove lies not simply in his refusal 
 
 138. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, bk. VIII, ch. 8, at 267 (“On the other hand, those who 
desire the honour or respect of good men and men who know, are anxious to confirm their 
own opinion of themselves; they rejoice, therefore, in the assurance of their worth which 
they gain from confidence in the judgment of those who declare it.”). 
 139. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 50–51 (Arlington 
House, 1969) (1759) (comparing our self-interested assessment of right conduct with “the 
cool and impartial spectator”); see also WELSH, supra note 7, at 168–82 (discussing the role 
of honor in Adam Smith’s theory of the impartial spectator); cf. Stephen Darwall, Smith’s 
Ambivalence About Honour, 5 ADAM SMITH REV. 106 (2010) (discussing Adam Smith’s 
criticisms of the ethic of honor). 
2011] THE HONOR OF PRIVATE LAW 55 
to recognize the inherent human dignity of the old woman.  It also lies in 
the fact that it takes away the more particularistic dignity she had before the 
shove.  Likewise, dignity may be lost through one’s own actions.  Bill 
Clinton lost dignity through his sexual peccadilloes in the Oval Office.140  
When he played Moses before Pharaoh in Cecil B. DeMille’s The Ten 
Commandments, Charlton Heston acted with dignity; when he histrionically 
waved aloft a Kentucky rifle at an NRA rally and made pledges about 
prying it loose from his cold, dead hands he was not acting with dignity.141
The dignity discussed in these examples may be related to the dignity of 
universal human worth, but it is clearly not the same thing.  It does not 
reside equally in all people.  It is not an inherent feature of humanity.  It can 
be lost or diminished through either one’s own actions or through the 
actions of others.  Sharon Krause has observed, “When the word dignity is 
used in this way it is a democratic euphemism for honor, because it is tied 
to exceptional action, high achievement, and extraordinary character.”
 
142
B.  Acting to Vindicate One’s Honor 
  
While her emphasis on honor as a basis for action leads her to overstate the 
extent to which dignity is tied to noteworthy acts, she is surely right that the 
idea of honor continues to exist within our moral discourse, albeit cloaked 
in democratic euphemism. 
An honor-based defense of civil recourse, however, requires more than 
simply the rehabilitation of the idea of honor for a modern, democratic 
society.  It must also explain why a victim acting against a wrongdoer that 
has dishonored him or her is normatively attractive.  In A Theory of Justice, 
Rawls argues that the idea of self-respect is a key aspect of living a good 
life.  “Self-respect is not so much a part of any rational plan of life,” he 
writes, “as the sense that one’s plan is worth carrying out.”143
[S]elf-respect implies a confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is within 
one’s power, to fulfill one’s intentions.  When we feel that our plans are 
of little value, we cannot pursue them with pleasure or take delight in 
their execution.  Nor plagued by failure and self-doubt can we continue 
our endeavors.  It is clear then why self-respect is a primary good.  
Without it nothing may seem worth doing, or if some things have value 
for us, we lack the will to strive for them.
  Elsewhere, 
he elucidates this idea: 
144
 
 140. The case of Bill Clinton’s loss of dignity is complicated in part because in his case, 
part of the dignity at stake was tied to an office.  Hence, one can speak of him diminishing 
the “dignity of the Presidency.”  Clinton, however, did more than simply tarnish the dignity 
of his office.  He also tarnished his own personal dignity. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BENNETT, 
THE DEATH OF OUTRAGE:  BILL CLINTON AND THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN IDEALS (1998); 
Editorial, Date with Destiny, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Aug. 16, 1998, at J2. 
 
 141. Compare THE TEN COMMANDMENTS (Paramount Pictures 1956), with Osha Gray 
Davidson, All Fired Up:  The NRA Makes a Lot of Noise, but That Doesn’t Help the Gun 
Owners of America, WASH. POST, June 4, 2000, at B1. 
 142. See KRAUSE, supra note 7, at 16. 
 143. RAWLS, supra note 26, at 155. 
 144. Id. at 386. 
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Rawls acknowledges that self-respect is tied to the respect of others.145  
Our self-respect is a function, in part, of others’ acknowledgment that we 
are entitled to respect.  The implications that he draws from this fact, 
however, are couched entirely in the idiom of public law.  He speaks in 
terms of duties of respect toward others, and of the need for beneficent 
social planners in the original position to ensure a just distribution of self-
respect through the principles of distributive justice that Rawls advances.146
One can see honor in this discussion clothed in the kind of democratic 
euphemism discussed above.  Self-respect is esteem toward one’s own life, 
an esteem bolstered by the esteem of others.  This is honor.  What is 
missing from Rawls’s discussion is an appreciation for the value of agency, 
in particular, self-assertion in the face of attacks on one’s self-respect.  To 
be sure, Rawls sees self-respect as a wellspring for action—“confidence in 
one’s ability . . . to fulfill one’s intentions”
 
147—but he sees little role for 
agency in maintaining one’s self-respect.  Rather, Rawls conceptualizes it 
as something that one is gifted by the basic structure of society, a form of 
entitlement to be distributed like welfare payments or voting rights.148
Self-respect, however, cannot simply be distributed by a third-party.  In 
this Homer was a more acute student of the human condition than Rawls.  
In The Iliad, honor is not ultimately dispensed by the gods, but is gained by 
heroic actions.  “Fight like men, my friends,” urges Patroclus, “Now we 
must win high honor for Peleus’ royal son . . . .”
 
149  It is deeds that win the 
honor, even honor for another.  Obviously, the blood-thirsty agency exalted 
by Homer cannot be justified, but he is right to focus on the role of human 
action in maintaining self-respect.  “By disconnecting abilities from self-
esteem,” writes one critic, “Rawls makes self-confidence into an assertion 
rather than an achievement.”150
Humiliation poses a particular threat to self-respect.  In this context 
humiliation is more than simply embarrassment.  It is something that one 
person does to another person.  When a person insults another, that person 
denies that the insulted party is entitled to respect, placing them in a 
subordinate status to the person offering the insult.  A person vindicates her 
honor by acting against the person that offered the insult and forcing the 
insulting party to respond in a way that acknowledges the equality of the 
insulted party, in effect enacting her entitlement to be treated with respect, 
her honor.  The logic of dueling illustrates how this is so. 
 
 
 145. See id. at 155–56 (“Now our self-respect normally depends upon the respect of 
others.  Unless we feel that our endeavors are respected by them, it is difficult if not 
impossible for us to maintain the conviction that our ends are worth advancing.”). 
 146. See id. at 155–60 (discussing the role of self-respect in the deliberations of agents in 
the original position). 
 147. See id. at 386. 
 148. See KRAUSE, supra note 7, at 18 (“Thus self-esteem is a good to be distributed, 
according to Rawls, and in a just society it will be distributed equally.”). 
 149. HOMER, THE ILIAD 421 (Robert Fagles trans., Viking Penguin 1990). 
 150. KRAUSE, supra note 7, at 19. 
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During its heyday, dueling was condemned as an immoral and irrational 
practice, and historians have generally echoed this judgment.151  Dueling 
was not without its own logic, however.  The gentleman who challenged 
another gentleman to a duel did a number of things.152  First, he 
demonstrated not only bravery but also the high value that he placed on his 
own honor.153  He showed the world that he was willing to risk death rather 
than suffer an insult.  Second, he forced his rival to address him as an 
equal.154  By attacking him physically—albeit via the highly stylized rules 
of the code duello—a duelist forced his opponent quite literally to 
acknowledge him as an adversary on equal terms.  It was not violence per 
se that achieved this equality.155  Rather, it was the way in which the 
stylized violence of dueling created a confrontation where the insulting 
party had to meet the insulted party on equal terms.156
Only social equals could challenge one another to duels.
 
157  A gentleman 
would never challenge a tradesman to a duel or vice versa.  More 
importantly, the practice of the duel eliminated distinctions between 
gentlemen.158  For example, in 1829, the Duke of Wellington fought a duel 
with the Earl of Winchilsea.159  The duel came at the height of the debate 
over Catholic emancipation, and Winchilsea had published a pamphlet 
accusing Wellington of dishonest political tactics.160  Despite the fact that 
both men had noble titles, they actually occupied quite different social 
positions.161  Wellington was the hero of Waterloo and the Peninsular 
campaigns of the Napoleonic wars.162  He was also Prime Minister.163  He 
thus occupied the apogee of political life as both the first soldier and 
leading statesman of the realm.164  Winchilsea, in contrast, was a 
comparative nobody, a political crank on the fringe of the aristocracy.165  
Yet on the dueling field both men were equals, gentlemen defending their 
honor without any formal recognition of the gulf in prestige that separated 
Wellington from Winchilsea.166
 
 151. See, e.g., APPIAH, supra note 
 
7, at 31–37 (condemning dueling as immoral and 
irrational). 
 152. See id. at 19–22; LaCroix, supra note 7, at 512. 
 153. See APPIAH, supra note 7, at 13; LaCroix, supra note 7, at 512–14. 
 154. See APPIAH, supra note 7, at 15; LaCroix, supra note 7, at 512–14. 
 155. See APPIAH, supra note 7, at 25; LaCroix, supra note 7, at 512–14. 
 156. See APPIAH, supra note 7, at 19; LaCroix, supra note 7, at 512–14. 
 157. See APPIAH, supra note 7, at 15; LaCroix, supra note 7, at 512–14. 
 158. See APPIAH, supra note 7, at 15–16; LaCroix, supra note 7, at 512–14. 
 159. See APPIAH, supra note 7, at 3–6 (discussing lead-up to the duel). 
 160. Id. at 8 (“He alleged that the king’s first minister had dissembled in offering his 
financial support for the creation of King’s College London as an Anglican institution to 
counterbalance the recent secular foundation of London University.”). 
 161. Id. at 8–9 (noting the different social positions of the two men).  
 162. Id. at 3. 
 163. Id.   
 164. Id. at 3–4. 
 165. Id. at 9 (describing the Earl as “a peer of no personal importance, but a stalwart 
upholder of Church and State”) (internal citation omitted). 
 166. Id. at 15 (“Wellington treated Winchilsea as a gentleman in challenging him to a 
duel.”). 
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The duel can be usefully contrasted here to the practice of caning, a form 
of stylized violence that reinforced contempt rather than equality.167  When 
a social inferior insulted a gentleman’s honor, there was never any question 
of fighting a duel.  Such disputes about vertical honor could either be 
resolved via a suit for libel or slander, or more directly by a private 
beating.168  Such a beating, while violent, was not the equivalent of a duel.  
A gentleman need not be directly involved and could send his servants to 
perform the deed.169  Indeed, part of the abandonment of the duel in the 
antebellum North can be attributed to the way that litigation came to be 
seen as more like dueling and less like caning.  As Northern society became 
more egalitarian, the importance of distinctions between gentlemen and 
common people receded.170  This did not mean that the concept of honor 
lost its meaning, only that it no longer took its meaning from a hierarchical 
social structure.171
Obviously, the stylized attempted murder of the duel cannot be morally 
justified.  Its underlying logic, however, illuminates why acting against 
someone to vindicate one’s honor is normatively defensible.  An attack 
invites a response in kind from the person being attacked.  This reflexive 
response creates a situation of acknowledged equality between the parties at 
the moment of confrontation, even if one party is ultimately stronger than 
the other or if the means of attack and defense are constrained.  In his short 
story His Private Honour, Rudyard Kipling illustrates the way in which a 
fair fight can establish equality and respect across social castes and 
hierarchies.
  Instead, all free citizens came to be seen as in some 
sense a peer group.  Rather than adopting the view that this meant that 
everyone should duel with everyone, however, antebellum Northerners 
came to see litigation as a sufficient means of redeeming one’s honor even 
with peers. 
172  In the story, a young lieutenant in the British Army 
humiliates a grizzled old soldier.173
 
 167. See FREEMAN, supra note 
  The difference in military ranks 
reinforced the social gulf between the upper class, educated lieutenant and 
7, at 172. 
 168. See id. at 174 (discussing an incident between Representatives Lyon and Griswold 
that ended in a fracas on the House floor); LaCroix, supra note 7, at 515 (“Most duels arose 
out of a verbal slight in which one gentleman called into question the character of another by 
using certain coded words such as ‘puppy,’ ‘liar, poltroon, [or] coward.’” (citing Joanne B. 
Freeman, Dueling as Politics:  Reinterpreting the Burr-Hamilton Duel, 53 WM. & MARY Q. 
289, 299 (1996); WYATT-BROWN, supra note 7, at 360)). 
 169. See FREEMAN, supra note 7, at 172 (noting the practice of “caning”); LaCroix, supra 
note 7, at 512–14 (describing the code of honor).  
 170. See LaCroix, supra note 7, at 545–51 (noting the decline of dueling in the North). 
 171. See id. at 568 (“Imploring the duelist to abandon the quest to throw the correct 
shadow onto the screen of his society and back onto himself, opponents of dueling such as 
Beecher, Dwight, and Colton attempted to invert the dynamic of honor so that the right to 
call oneself a gentleman would derive from internal character rather than external reputation, 
from virtue rather than its hollow reflection.”). 
 172. RUDYARD KIPLING, His Private Honour, in MANY INVENTIONS 151, 151–80 (1926). 
 173. The lieutenant, Ouless, struck the soldier, Ortheris, with a riding cane during a drill. 
Id. at 163–64. 
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the barely literate cockney veteran.174  The young lieutenant struggles with 
how to restore the soldier’s honor in a world where fixed hierarchies of rank 
and status seem to preclude the two men ever meeting as equals.175  Finally, 
the two men agree to meet in a fair fight.176  In the melee of punches 
thrown and dodged, the lieutenant is shorn of the protections of hierarchy 
and is literally forced to meet the wronged man on equal terms.177
It goes without saying, of course, that a confrontation to vindicate one’s 
lost honor necessarily involves the danger of violence and arbitrary 
outcomes based on the strength of the parties rather than the merits of their 
respective moral claims against one another.  Indeed, the danger of 
unregulated private recourse is at the heart of the civil recourse theory to 
which this Article seeks to contribute.
 
178
C.  Reasons for the State to Provide Recourse 
  The manifest dangers of private 
retaliation, however, should not blind us to the way in which acting against 
someone in a way that demands a defensive response establishes an equality 
that gives the lie to the inequality inherent in the original insult.  Notice 
also, that this equality-in-confrontation cannot be established through a 
third party punishing the offender.  Indeed, the appeal to the power of a 
third party can be a declaration of powerlessness that reinforces rather than 
challenges the original insult.  Likewise, an “unfair fight” such as an 
ambush or a gang of servants sent to cane an uppity social inferior cannot 
perform this task.  Rather, what is needed is a situation in which the 
insulted party strikes out against the insulting party in a way that demands a 
response predicated on the equality and fairness of the confrontation.  A fair 
fight after an insult re-establishes respect and honor. 
A defense of civil recourse, however, must also explain why the state has 
good reasons to empower plaintiffs to act against defendants who have 
wronged them.  Another way of posing the same problem is to imagine a 
world in which the private law did not exist and there was no way for 
victims of wrongs to act against those that have wronged them.  This is, in 
effect, the strategy adopted by Goldberg and Zipursky.179
 
 174. Id. at 164 (“After seven years’ service and three medals, he had been struck by a boy 
younger than himself!”). 
  They claim that 
in such a world the state would be failing to meet its duties under a Lockean 
social contract.  By suppressing private violence, the law could deprive 
persons of their due, argue Goldberg and Zipursky, because man has, in the 
words of Locke, “besides the right of punishment common to him with 
other Men, a particular Right to seek Reparation from him that has done 
 175. Id. at 166–67. 
 176. Ouless invited Ortheris to go shooting with him and when they were away from the 
camp, the two men agreed to fight. Id. at 176–78. 
 177. Id. at 178 (“I got ‘im one on the nose that painted ‘is little aristocratic white shirt for 
‘im.”). 
 178. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 30, at 734–36 (discussing the civility of 
civil recourse theory). 
 179. See Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, supra note 30, at 640–42. 
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it.”180  To avoid this injustice, the state has a duty to provide its citizens 
with a system of private law.181
Consider an example from Charles Dickens’s novel A Tale of Two 
Cities.
  We can adopt a similar strategy for 
thinking about the vindication of one’s honor.  What evil would result were 
it impossible for those who are humiliated to act against those that have 
dishonored them? 
182  In the book, the Marquis Evremonde, driving his carriage 
recklessly through the streets of Paris, kills the young son of a humble sans 
culotte named Gaspard.183  Evremonde throws a coin at the man to 
compensate him for his loss, but only after berating him for not taking 
better care of his children and for endangering Evremonde’s horses.184  The 
grief stricken man grovels in the pavement before the Marquis, and the 
thoroughly cowed pre-revolutionary crowd of onlookers does nothing.185  
As Evremonde drives away, however, someone throws the coin back into 
his carriage in an act of anonymous defiance.186  Gaspard, the father of the 
dead boy, subsequently murders the Marquis.187
In a sense, the story of Gaspard and the Marquis Evremonde is the story 
of a tort.  There is negligence and wrongful death.  Dickens has constructed 
his story so as to offer moral condemnation on several different levels.  At 
the outset, we are invited to loathe the Marquis Evremonde.  He is selfish, 
thoughtless of others, and cruel.  Interestingly, his villainy is not lessened 
by his nod toward the duty of corrective justice.  After all, he does throw a 
coin to Gaspard.  There are two things that are worth noting about the 
tossed coin.  First, the Marquis acted on the duty of corrective justice 
without any agency on Gaspard’s part.  Indeed, throughout the encounter 
Gaspard remained prostrate.  Second, while the amount that the Marquis 
tendered to the grieving father may have been too little—and therefore his 
fulfillment of the duty of corrective justice a sham—this is not why the 
incident of the coin serves to further excite the disgust of the reader.  In part 
this may simply be because the loss of a child to a loving father can never 
be compensated for, and the offer of so trifling an amount was an insult to 
the memory of Gaspard’s son.  Imagine, however, that rather than throwing 
a coin into the mud, the Marquis dropped a chest containing more wealth 
than the impoverished Gaspard or his son would have realized in a lifetime 
of toil.  Such an act would have been as complete a discharge of the duty of 
corrective justice as would be possible under the circumstances, but still it 
would arouse the reader’s ire against Evremonde.  There is some sin beyond 
inadequate compensation that the Marquis has committed with his coin.  It 
is a gesture of contempt. 
 
 
 180. LOCKE, supra note 44, at 291. 
 181. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, supra note 30, at 642. 
 182. CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CITIES (Modern Library ed. 1996) (1859). 
 183. Id. at 138–40. 
 184. Id. at 139–40. 
 185. Id. at 140. 
 186. Id. at 140–41. 
 187. Id. at 163. 
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It is important to see, however, that Dickens is not simply condemning 
the villainy of the Marquis Evremonde in this story.  Beyond his fictional 
Marquis, Dickens is condemning the ancien regime in France.  Lest readers 
misunderstand the object of his critique, Dickens wrote in his Preface to the 
novel: 
Whenever any reference (however slight) is made here to the condition of 
the French people before or during the Revolution, it is truly made, on the 
faith of the most trustworthy witnesses.  It has been one of my hopes to 
add something to the popular and picturesque means of understanding that 
terrible time . . . .188
Dickens condemns the ancien regime by showing the way in which it 
humiliated ordinary people.  This evil did not lie in the fact that the Marquis 
was a villain.  Villains exist in every society.  Rather, the ancien regime 
humiliated Gaspard by denying him any agency against his wrongdoer. 
 
Dickens’s critique of the ancien regime lay in the situation in which it 
placed Gaspard.  He had no means of seeking redress against the Marquis.  
He had no legal rights against the Marquis.  He could not even challenge 
him to a duel.  The lack of recourse stripped Gaspard of any ability to 
respond to the way in which the Marquis’s actions asserted the absence of 
any entitlement to respect on his part.  In his helplessness Gaspard was in 
effect made complicit in his own humiliation.  Reduced to groveling 
silently in the street, Gaspard’s inability to respond reasserted the Marquis’s 
insult to him and his son.  In this sense the evil that he suffered at the hands 
of the ancien regime in his humiliation is akin to the evil created in a case of 
compelled speech.  In this case, he was effectively kept from denying his 
own lack of honor and coerced to in effect reassert the insult against 
himself.  The murder Gaspard commits thus becomes more than simply an 
act of revenge.  It is the means by which he asserts his entitlement to 
respect—his honor—in the face of a system that denies it. 
Of course, the artistry of Dickens’s tale lies in part in its multiplicity.  
One cannot reduce Gaspard’s action to the simple vindication of honor.  He 
is also acting out of revenge and grief at the loss of his son.  Within the 
narrative economy of Dickens’s treatment of the ancien regime, however, 
the murder of the Marquis serves to illuminate the humiliation that it visited 
upon its citizens.  Tellingly, Gaspard is executed in the novel, the only 
appearance of the law in the story serving as a reminder of how it barred all 
avenues of action against the Marquis.189
 
 188. Id. at ix.  Dickens went on to write, “though no one can hope to add anything to the 
philosophy of Mr. Carlyle’s wonderful book.” Id.  Modern historians have been less 
enamored of Carlyle’s vision of a wholly prostrate and tyrannized French population under 
the ancien regime than was Dickens. See SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS:  A CHRONICLE OF THE 
FRENCH REVOLUTION 183–99 (1989) (discussing liberal legal reforms in the decades before 
the Revolution). 
  In short, the Marquis treats 
Gaspard and his loved ones with contempt, humiliating them, and the evil 
of the ancien regime lies in part in the way in which it deprives Gaspard of 
any means of vindicating his honor against this humiliation. 
 189. See DICKENS, supra note 182, at 212–18.  
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To see how civil recourse responds to the evil of dishonor, consider 
another, less enduring work of fiction, John Grisham’s novel The 
Rainmaker.190  The story revolves around a recent law school graduate who 
is left to set up solo practice with a single client, the family of a young man 
dying of leukemia whose health insurance company wrongly cut off his 
medical care.  The boy dies, and the young lawyer pursues a wrongful death 
action against the insurance company.  The drama of the book centers on 
the David and Goliath struggle of the poor family and their neophyte lawyer 
against a powerful company that believes it can treat the weak defendants 
with contempt.  A key piece of evidence in the trial is a letter sent by the 
company to the mother denying one of her many appeals for payment under 
the policy.  In the letter, the company’s claims officer writes that given her 
repeated unsuccessful importuning she must be “stupid, stupid, stupid.”191
To be sure, Grisham’s novel is a contrived morality tale, but it is 
precisely in the contrived moral action of the story that its theoretical 
interest lies.  It reveals an important aspect of what is at stake in civil 
litigation.  The evil being addressed is more than simply the loss suffered 
by the plaintiff.  It is the way in which the defendant’s conduct treats the 
plaintiff with contempt.  Grisham’s use of the insulting letter from the 
company is a ploy to dramatize this.  In one of the climactic scenes of the 
novel, the mother of the dead boy is cross-examined by the insurance 
company’s lawyer.  “What’re you going to do with the money if the jury 
gives you ten million dollars?” he asks.  “Give it to the American Leukemia 
Society,” she responds.  “Every penny.  I don’t want a dime of your stinkin’ 
money.”
 
192
It is important to understand that the same effect could not be achieved if 
the insurance company were simply prosecuted for fraud or some other 
crime.  By suing the company, by standing up to it, the mother transformed 
herself from a passive victim into an agent, an equal who could demand and 
receive respect.  Seeing criminal sanctions as sufficient to rectify the evil of 
the situation falls into the Rawlsian trap of seeing self-respect as something 
that can be dispensed by a beneficent state.  Likewise, it is possible to 
imagine an alternative plot line in A Tale of Two Cities in which the 
  What matters about this scene is not its realism but rather the 
fact that it has a conceptual integrity.  Her response makes moral sense.  
Notice, it makes no dramatic sense to see her as pursuing optimal levels of 
investment in avoiding breach of contract.  Likewise, her refusal of the 
money disclaims the demands of corrective justice.  She is not seeking 
compensation for her loss.  Rather, by acting against the company she is no 
longer forced to be complicit in her own humiliation.  She is not Gaspard 
groveling in the street.  By acting against the company she forces it to treat 
her as an equal, if only as an adversary within the contrived confrontation of 
the courtroom.  In short, she vindicates her honor. 
 
 190. JOHN GRISHAM, THE RAINMAKER (1995). 
 191. Id. at 16 (“Dear Mrs. Black:  On seven prior occasions this company has denied your 
claim in writing.  We now deny it for the eighth and final time.  You must be stupid, stupid, 
stupid!”). 
 192. See id. at 342.  
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Marquis Evremonde was punished by a virtuous king.  In such a story we 
might feel that Evremonde had received justice, but it would also reinforce 
Gaspard’s humiliation rather than allow him to redeem it.  There is a 
difference between being rescued or defended, and achieving self-respect 
by redeeming one’s honor.  Civil recourse allows for the regaining of honor 
in the face of its loss by giving the victim a means of acting against a 
wrongdoer. 
Civil recourse does not guarantee anyone’s honor or self-respect.  Such is 
beyond the ability of law to guarantee.  Rather, it provides a means by 
which agency can be exercised in the assertion and defense of one’s honor.  
Agency thus serves to mediate differences of dignity and honor.  As 
discussed above, not everyone possesses honor in the same degree.  
Suppose a victim of a civil wrong does not wish to assert him or herself 
against the tortfeasor or contract breaker.  The victim may hold their honor 
cheap.  The law allows people to make that choice.  It does not punish 
affronts to honor.  Likewise, suppose that a person without apparent dignity 
decides to sue in the face of an insult.  Imagine a clown, who in the course 
of his slapstick normally submits to good natured horseplay from the 
audience.  The clown is the opposite of the dignified matron imagined 
above, a person without apparent honor.  The clown may nevertheless be 
allowed to sue in battery against the person who unjustifiably shoves him 
should he choose to do so.  At that moment, the clown may be without 
dignity, but this is not a defense for the tortfeasor.  By empowering the 
clown to act, the law not only provides him with the means of vindicating 
honor that already exists, but also provides him—and all other plaintiffs—a 
tool with which to construct and defend it.193
D.  Civil Recourse and Our Private Law 
 
Finally, a defense of civil recourse requires more than showing that the 
state has reasons for providing victims with a means of acting against those 
who have dishonored them.  It must also show that the actual institutions of 
our private law can be plausibly understood in such terms.  One might 
believe that the state should provide a means for victims to vindicate their 
honor but deny that this is what litigation actually does or that such 
concerns can be connected to the substantive law of torts and contracts. 
1.  Litigation 
As discussed above, allowing civil recourse does not guarantee anyone’s 
honor.  Rather it gives plaintiffs one tool with which to defend or establish 
their honor.  The limited role of recourse in the struggle for honor accounts 
in part for the agonistic experience of litigation.  Suing someone is more 
 
 193. Cf. KRAUSE, supra note 7, at 19 (“Self-respect, which is a necessary condition of 
agency, cannot be guaranteed without undercutting agency.  We must have enough self-
respect to have the desire for self-respect, but not so much that we no longer need to reach 
for it.  Rawls means to support agency by democratizing self-respect in the form of equal 
‘self-esteem,’ but in fact he undercuts agency.”). 
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than simply a petition for redress.  It is an act of aggression by the plaintiff 
against the wrongdoer.  Likewise, the process of litigation is a battle and a 
struggle.  Understandably, this agonistic aspect of litigation is frequently 
deplored.194  Americans, we are told, are too litigious and quarrelsome.195
The vindication of wronged honor also fits nicely with the adversary 
system.  Generally speaking, the procedural rules that seek to ensure the 
fairness of the adversary process are justified on one of two grounds.  First, 
these rules can be seen as promoting better deliberation by judicial decision 
makers.
  
There is no doubt some truth to these claims, but in this sense litigation-
happy Americans are like eighteenth-century gentlemen touchy about their 
dignity and eager for a duel, or like Homeric heroes, willing to incur great 
costs to vindicate their slighted honor.  The argument offered here does not 
deny that litigation has costs.  Rather, it asserts that the agonistic struggle of 
private law is not simply a cost.  By empowering victims to act, civil 
recourse creates the struggle that is itself a process of giving citizens a way 
of vindicating their honor and asserting the bases of their self-respect in the 
face of attack. 
196  The idea is that the contending arguments of litigants are the 
best way of getting at the truth, which will emerge from the competition of 
the parties.  Second, we might justify these rules as increasing the 
legitimacy of outcomes.197
2.  Tort Law 
  Litigants are more likely to defer to the final 
decision of the court and regard it as justified if the decision emerges from a 
process in which they have been given an opportunity to present their 
arguments.  The vindication of wronged honor suggests a third option.  
Rather than acting as an epistemic aid to decision makers or a prop to their 
legitimacy, the adversary system may be seen as an end in itself.  The 
purpose of the adversary system is to provide a forum for a fair fight 
between the plaintiff and the defendant, and it is in the very process of this 
struggle that the plaintiff’s honor is vindicated. 
The claims of honor are strongest in the case of intentional torts, 
particularly those that are aimed directly at a subject’s standing before 
others, such as the torts of libel or defamation.  Such actions arise out of 
situations in which the tortfeasor has deliberately treated the victim as an 
object that he can harm with impunity.  On the other hand, most of tort 
litigation does not consist of such intentional torts.198
 
 194. See PHILIP K. HOWARD, LIFE WITHOUT LAWYERS:  LIBERATING AMERICANS FROM 
TOO MUCH LAW 68–92 (2009). 
  Rather, the vast 
 195. Id. (decrying the rise of frivolous lawsuits). 
 196. See, e.g., Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 
37 IND. L. REV. 65, 127 (2003) (“An adversarial process will improve deliberation by 
expanding the depth and breadth of the issues brought before the court.”). 
 197. See, e.g., Elizabeth Mertz, Inside the Law School Classroom:  Toward a New Legal 
Realist Pedagogy, 60 VAND. L. REV. 483, 501 (2007) (“Overall, the U.S. legal system relies 
on an adversarial process—a clash of opposing discursive positions—for its legitimacy.”). 
 198. See generally Marc Galanter, Real World Torts:  An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. 
REV. 1093 (1996). 
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majority of tort actions arise under the doctrine of negligence.199  
Negligence need not require any deliberate insult to the victim.200  Indeed, 
in many negligence suits the tortfeasor may be subjectively unaware of the 
victim.  In these cases the claim that tort law serves to vindicate the 
wronged honor of the plaintiff seems weak.  Likewise, many torts involve 
strict liability where it is not even necessary to demonstrate that the 
defendant failed to use reasonable care.201
While negligence may not involve deliberate wrongdoing toward the 
plaintiff, conceptualizing the wrong suffered in terms of insult is not 
difficult.  Care is a form of respect.  For example, among the Bedouin, 
treating a guest with honor is tied up in caring for a guest’s needs.
  In such situations it seems even 
more tenuous to regard litigation as vindicating insulted honor.  There is 
nevertheless evidence that both negligence and some forms of strict liability 
fit within the argument put forward in this Article. 
202
Medical malpractice, one of the most commonly litigated species of tort, 
illustrates this point.
  
Honor requires that one consider and direct attention toward the person 
bearing that honor.  This is the opposite of a negligent action.  Someone 
who is negligent in effect fails to direct care toward a person deserving of 
such care.  Rather, the negligent person ignores her victim or fails to give 
him the level of attention to which he is entitled.  To commit such an action 
can send a powerful message of indifference and even contempt.  In this 
sense, negligence is insulting. 
203  When hospitals negligently harm a patient, lawyers 
will often counsel the hospital to avoid any admission of wrongdoing to the 
harmed party.204  The rationale for such an approach is simple enough to 
see:  such admissions could later be used against the hospital in 
litigation.205  There is evidence to suggest, however, that in many cases a 
simple apology by the hospital mollifies the anger of victims, leading to 
easier settlements and less litigation.206
 
 199. Id. at 1099–1108 (describing the dispute pyramid, a visualization tool for 
understanding the tort litigation system). 
  Such a result, however, makes little 
sense from either an economic or corrective justice perspective.  The 
economic account of tort law suggests that plaintiffs should use the 
admission inherent in an apology to maximize their return in litigation.  
Corrective justice theories, in turn, suggest that apologies are irrelevant to 
 200. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965) (listing elements of negligence 
tort). 
 201. See id. § 519 (describing the strict liability standard). 
 202. See STEWART, supra note 7, at 86–88 (explaining Bedouin honor rules). 
 203. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Contracting over Liability:  Medical Malpractice and the 
Cost of Choice, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 957 (2010) (providing recent statistics on malpractice 
cases). 
 204. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009, 
1011 (1999) (describing medical malpractice litigation strategy). 
 205. Id. 
 206. See Brent T. White, Say You’re Sorry:  Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights 
Remedy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261, 1271 (2006) (noting a study of plaintiffs in medical 
malpractice that showed that “37% wouldn’t have filed suit had the doctor fully explained 
and offered an apology to begin with”). 
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the rights and duties of the parties.  The victim has still suffered a loss at the 
defendant’s hands.  On the other hand, if part of what motivates tort 
litigation is the logic of Gaspard and The Rainmaker—the desire to 
vindicate the insult suffered at the hands of the tortfeasor—then the power 
of apologies makes sense.  Apologies do nothing to create efficient levels of 
investment in precaution or compensate victims for losses.  They can, 
however, remove the insult involved in a tort by disclaiming the meaning 
inherent in the actions of an Evremonde, namely that the victim is a person 
undeserving of respect and care. 
Strict liability presents a stronger challenge to the idea of litigation as the 
vindication of wronged honor.  Indeed, I am inclined to side with Jane 
Stapleton at this point and admit that certain aspects of the law of torts may 
be best conceptualized in terms of compensation or loss spreading.207  The 
claims of such an approach seem strongest in the case of strict liability torts.  
Yet even here, the idea of civil recourse as the vindication of wronged 
honor is not completely without substance.  Consider the classic strict 
liability tort of engaging in some ultra-hazardous activity, such as using 
explosives.208
The second way of thinking about strict liability and the vindication of 
honor is to see the rule as serving an evidentiary function.  The idea here is 
that there are certain activities that are so dangerous that rather than proving 
negligence, it may in effect simply be assumed.
  There are at least two ways of seeing the damages that could 
flow from such an activity as an affront to someone’s honor.  First, one 
could note that the decision to use such explosives itself can be an insult.  
This seems odd.  The building demolition crew that uses C-4 and takes 
every precaution not to harm anyone is not engaged in insulting behavior in 
the same way that a negligent driver, for example, fails to show proper 
respect for others.  Yet the building crew has taken actions that it knows 
may, despite its best efforts, result in harm to others.  In this sense, it has 
held the security of others as a thing it need not entirely respect. 
209  If strict liability serves 
this function then it may be seen as insulting in the same way that 
negligence is seen as insulting, namely as a failure to show proper care.210  
The difference is that in the strict liability case the necessity of proving the 
absence of care is dispensed with for idiosyncratic practical reasons.211
 
 207. See Stapleton, supra note 
  
There are, of course, problems with this approach, the most striking being 
that strict liability acts as more than simply an evidentiary presumption.  It 
52, at 1538. 
 208. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1965) (listing elements of ultra-
hazardous activity tort). 
 209. See id. cmt. f. 
 210. See id. § 281 (noting duty of care as one of the elements of a negligence tort). 
 211. See id. § 519 cmt. d (“It is founded upon a policy of the law that imposes upon 
anyone who for his own purposes creates an abnormal risk of harm to his neighbors, the 
responsibility of relieving against that harm when it does in fact occur.”). 
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forecloses the possibility of the defendant raising its non-negligent—indeed 
exemplary—conduct as a defense.212
3.  Contract Law 
 
Even accepting the arguments made above, one might contend that while 
the vindication of wronged honor fits with actions such as libel, defamation, 
and intentional torts such as fraud or battery, it is disconnected from 
contract law.  This objection could take two forms.  The first is that the 
doctrinal structures that define contractual liability simply do not pick out 
situations involving insult or humiliation of the breachee.  The second is 
that the vindication of honor does not describe the motives of litigants in 
contract cases. 
To a certain extent the doctrinal objection has merit.  For example, one 
might imagine a law of contracts where the doctrines of formation were 
organized so as to pick out the sort of agreements whose breach would 
result in insult.  Likewise, one could imagine that the doctrines surrounding 
breach itself could be organized so as to allow a plaintiff to sue successfully 
only when the breach could plausibly be seen as an insult to someone’s 
honor.  There are reasons to suppose, however, that whatever the structure 
of such an imaginary legal system would look like, it does not closely 
match the one that we have.  For example, gratuitous promises, whose 
breach might be deeply insulting, are unenforceable unless they are 
supported by consideration or fall into one of the exceptions to the 
consideration rule.213
Despite these powerful arguments, however, there are doctrinal elements 
in both formation and breach that do seem to protect wronged honor.  If we 
accept that the breach of deliberately made promises is to be treated as more 
insulting than the breach of less well thought out contracts, then the 
doctrine of consideration is less of a stumbling block than it initially 
appears.  As Lon Fuller long ago argued, the doctrine of consideration can 
serve as a form as much as anything.
  Likewise, contract law generally treats a wholly 
inadvertent and innocent breach no differently than a deliberately 
humiliating one. 
214  Formal requirements, in turn, serve 
to pick out contracts that are more likely to be deliberately made and 
considered, what Fuller called the precautionary and channeling functions 
of consideration.215  The same point could be made with contracts under 
seal.216
 
 212. See id. § 519 (“One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to 
liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, 
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.”). 
  Likewise, the duty of good faith performance picks out a set of 
 213. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises:  An Examination of the 
Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1262 (1980) (“[G]ratuitous promises of gifts or 
unilateral pledges to confer benefits remain legally unenforceable.”). 
 214. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941). 
 215. See id. at 800–01.  
 216. See id. at 801 (“To the business man who wishes to make his own or another’s 
promise binding, the seal was at common law available as a device for the accomplishment 
of his objective.”). 
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contract breaches that do seem plausibly related to insults to one’s honor.217  
This doctrine has frequently been used to provide a remedy against a 
promisor whose conduct, while within the letter of the contract, 
nevertheless constitutes an abuse of power or discretion.218  For example, a 
secured lender who uses his discretion to call a loan can be subject to lender 
liability using a good faith theory if it can be shown that the exercise of the 
discretion arose out of a personality conflict or other argument.219
The motivation of parties in contract litigation may seem far removed 
from questions of offended honor.  Rather, much of the legal and scholarly 
discourse around contracts assumes that parties are hard-headed economic 
calculators.
 
220  Research in behavioral psychology, however, suggests 
otherwise.  People have more intense feelings of being wronged in cases 
involving a relationship of trust.221  Hence, researchers have found that 
given identical economic damages, lay people will generally demand 
greater compensation in cases where the damages are caused by breach of 
contract rather than tort.222  In particular, people become more offended by 
breach of contract the more they feel that they have been treated as 
suckers.223  Hence, intentional breaches call forth more intensity than 
accidental breaches, and damages caused by breach of contract made with a 
third party call forth less intensity.224  In short the victim of breach who 
feels exploited “is not only angry at the perpetrator, but he is also 
humiliated and self-conscious.  A sucker feels some self-blame for having 
voluntarily engaged in a transaction with a scoundrel.”225  There is thus 
good evidence that lay people experience breach of contract as a form of 
contempt, an affront to their sense of themselves, an attack on their honor.  
Hence, one could see contract litigation as a form of retaliation against the 
dishonoring breacher.226
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CONCLUSION 
Common law writers such as Coke and Blackstone saw the law as, in 
part, protecting a man’s honor.  “Lex est tutissima cassis,” declared Coke’s 
family motto.227
The arguments in this Article suggest that ultimately the vindication of 
honor provides a justification for civil recourse in the private law.  Its 
claims are strongest in cases of intentional torts and breaches of the duty of 
good faith.  It still has traction in the tort of negligence.  When it comes to 
strict liability torts, however, its relationship to the law seems more 
tenuous.  Ultimately, this muddy picture of the relationship between honor 
and the private law is not surprising.  No institutions as complicated and 
long-lived as contracts and torts can be reduced to a single normative 
concern.  Presenting such reductionism as the sine qua non of theoretical 
success is to condemn any attempt at interpretive theory to failure at the 
outset.  And yet despite its messy pluralism the common law is not without 
its reasons, and we may hope for a theory that will render our law more 
sensible and provide us with reasons for shifting it in one direction or the 
other. 
  It was the law that formed the armor that protected the 
weak from the insults of the strong.  While modernity has sent much of the 
rhetoric of honor underground, insult, humiliation, and the vindication of 
stolen honor persist in our society, even if we choose to cloak them in the 
euphemism of democratic rights or human dignity.  The modern state 
necessarily constrains much of our behavior, criminalizing the kinds of 
feuds and retaliation that served in earlier times to vindicate one’s honor.  
Dickens’s vision of the Marquis Evremonde in A Tale of Two Cities, 
however, shows the evil of a world in which those who suffer humiliation 
are without the means of acting against those who have harmed them.  The 
helplessness of victims in such a world in effect forces them to re-enact the 
humiliation of the insult against them.  This evil cannot be remedied by 
becoming the passive recipient of self-respect that is dispensed like a 
welfare right by the state.  Rather, it is only in the agency of the victim in 
either forgiving and forgetting the wrong or acting against the wrongdoer 
that the humiliation of the wrong can be erased and the honor of the victim 
reasserted. 
By the lights of this latter criteria, the vindication of honor offers some 
success.  It provides us with reasons for believing that our current legal 
practices, in particular the practice of empowering wronged plaintiffs to act 
against their victimizers, rests on normative foundations that can be 
articulated in terms of honor.  Furthermore, precisely because the 
vindication of honor does not track well across every civil wrong, it 
provides us with some critical bite.  Liability in those areas of law such as 
strict liability where it is most difficult to find a justification in the 
vindication of honor are, ceteris paribus, less normatively justified than 
 
However, when people feel insulted by breach of contract, they instead may pursue different 
categories of legal remedies altogether.”).  
 227. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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those areas where the claims of honor seem stronger.  Accordingly, for 
example, we should be more concerned about attempts to replace tort law 
with a system of no-fault social insurance in cases involving intentional 
torts than in cases of strict liability for ultra-hazardous materials.  Likewise, 
the case for empowering plaintiffs to go after contract breachers is stronger, 
on civil recourse grounds, in cases involving a breach of the obligation of 
good faith.  The idea of honor suggests revisiting the issue of fault in 
contract law, considering whether it might be wise to differentiate between 
intentional and inadvertent breaches. 
Debates over tort reform provide other examples of honor’s potential 
reach.  Much of the controversy has centered on the question of punitive 
damages.  Numerous states have passed statutes that limit the availability of 
such damages to cases where “the defendant consciously or deliberatively 
engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the 
plaintiff.”228  Likewise, in determining whether punitive damage awards 
run afoul of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court has “instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility of a 
defendant by considering whether . . . the harm was the result of intentional 
malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.”229
One might also employ the idea of honor critically.  In this Article, I have 
suggested that the process of litigation provides a fair fight between 
litigants, one that allows a wronged party to re-establish her honor.  While I 
believe that such an interpretation of private litigation is defensible, it is 
also true that it does not accord with many people’s subjective experience 
of litigation.  Far from being a dignified process, they may find the 
intrusiveness of discovery, the delays of the court, and the abstruse legal 
maneuverings of lawyers alienating and humiliating.  On this view, the 
legal system stands condemned of failing to provide the very thing that it 
supposedly promises to private litigants.  Even if one finds this darker view 
of litigation compelling—and there are many reasons for doing so—it is 
important to see the way in which the critique is strengthened by viewing 
  By focusing on intentional 
or malicious behavior, the law picks out those situations that are likely to 
result in the greatest insult to a plaintiff’s honor and protects his right to the 
heightened recourse of punitive damages. 
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private law through the lens of honor.  The law’s failure and hypocrisy are 
greater precisely because what the law promises is the recovery of lost 
dignity. 
Ultimately, however, the arguments put forward in this Article cannot lay 
such controversies to rest.  I have argued elsewhere that private law can and 
does pursue multiple goals.230
 
  There is nothing inconsistent with seeing 
compensation and more efficient incentives as parallel goals of private 
litigation, even if there will necessarily be messy trade-offs between these 
goals.  The possibility of such pluralism, however, also casts in doubt the 
ultimate value of using private law to vindicate lost honor.  In this Article, I 
have labored hard to show that honor and its vindication are values that 
deserve greater modern respect than they receive.  It cannot be denied, 
however, that they have their costs.  Indeed, if part of the value of private 
law lies in the forum that it creates for struggle between the parties, then the 
costs associated with litigiousness and conflict are a fixed part of 
vindicating one’s honor through the law.  These can no longer be seen 
merely as unfortunate byproducts of a system set up to serve other 
purposes, such as effective fact-finding and disaggregated enforcement.  
The very point of litigation may be to let people fight.  Indeed, by reducing 
the risks of responding to insults—losing a lawsuit is not nearly as likely to 
be fatal as losing a duel with pistols at twenty paces—the private law may 
actually encourage this costly behavior.  This Article has not attempted to 
evaluate these costs, but they cannot be dismissed as trivial.  In the end, a 
reasonable person may conclude that the vindication of honor simply is not 
worth the candle.  Before she makes that decision, however, our reasonable 
observer must grapple honestly with honor and the way in which our law 
provides for its vindication.  Forcing that question is the ultimate measure 
of the success of this Article’s argument. 
 
 230. See Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 
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